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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788240103321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Koeda Junko"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Informality and Bank Credit : : Evidence from Firm-Level Data / / Junko Koeda, Era Dabla-Norris"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-6892-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-1680-3"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84049-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-6955-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612840494"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (39 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[{"$nulls":4},"IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/94"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"332.1753"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Bank loans - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Informal sector (Economics) - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Business enterprises - Finance - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Money and Monetary Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Depository Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Micro Finance Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Mortgages"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Monetary economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Bank credit"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Credit"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Legal support in revenue administration"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax administration core functions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Revenue"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax administration and procedure"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Estonia, Republic of"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; I. Introduction; II. Analytical Framework; III. Empirical Strategy and Results; A. Empirical Model; B. Data and Summary Statistics; C. Empirical Results; D. Robustness Tests; IV. Conclusions; Tables; 1. Summary Statistics; 2. Correlation Matrix; 3. Baseline Regression; 4. Access to Credit and Informality: Impact of Business Environment; 5. Informality, Access to Credit, and Business Environment: Interaction Effects; 6. Access to Credit and Informality: Impact of Institutional Development; 7. Informality, Access to Credit, and Business Environment: Interaction Effects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"8. Extended Regressions: Firm Transparency and Performance9. Interaction Regressions: Informality, Firm Transparency, and Firm Performance; 10. Instrumental Variables Regression; Appendices; I. Solving the Model; II. Countries in the Sample; III. Variables and Sources; References"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","The paper relies on a firm-level data on transition economies to examine the relationship between informality and bank credit. We find evidence that informality is robustly and significantly associated with lower access to and use of bank credit. We also find that higher tax compliance costs reduce firms' reliance on bank credit, while a stronger quality of the legal environment is associated with higher access to credit even for financially opaque informal firms. An interactive term between a country-wide measure of tax compliance costs and the level of informal activity is negative and significant, suggesting that the negative association between informality and bank credit is stronger in countries with weak tax administration."]