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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA990003411210203316"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"DI BIASE, Simonetta"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Il Codice delle pari opportunità : tutele e sanzioni tra teoria e prassi / Simonetta Di Biase, Pierluigi Rausei"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Milanofiori Assago : IPSOA, 2006"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"88-217-2424-7"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"201 p. ; 24 cm"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Diritto & Pratica del Lavoro ; 5"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"344.01133"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Pari opportunità - Diritto del lavoro"]
[null,null,"Collocazione",null,"XXV.2.B. 315"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Italiano"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788227903321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Valderrama Laura"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Institutional Inertia / / Laura Valderrama"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-1742-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84402-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612844027"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-2181-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-7340-9"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"25 p"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Technological innovations"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Industrial management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Investments: Metals"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Labor"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Production and Operations Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Innovation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Research and Development"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Technological Change"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Intellectual Property Rights: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics: Production"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Metals and Metal Products"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Cement"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Glass"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Ceramics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Human Capital"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Skills"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Occupational Choice"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Labor Productivity"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Technology"]
[{"$nulls":4},"general issues"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Labour"]
[{"$nulls":4},"income economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Investment & securities"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Productivity"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Gold"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Human capital"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Wages"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Industrial productivity"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia."]