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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788226703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Laeven Luc"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis / / Luc Laeven, Harry Huizinga"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-3255-2"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-7354-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84413-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612844133"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-3492-5"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"41 p. : ill"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Banks and banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Accounting - Corrupt practices"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Risk Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Investments: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Industries: Financial Services"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Depository Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Micro Finance Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Mortgages"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International Financial Markets"]
[{"$nulls":4},"General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial services law & regulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Investment & securities"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Loans"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Loan loss provisions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Asset valuation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Securities"]
[{"$nulls":4},"State supervision"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Asset-liability management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial instruments"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks."]