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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788220703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Detragiache Enrica"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Responding to Banking Crises : : Lessons From Cross-Country Evidence / / Enrica Detragiache, Giang Ho"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2010"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-0025-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4519-6223-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84527-6"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-0868-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612845277"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"31 p"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Financial crises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Risk Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Central Banks and Their Policies"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Depository Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Micro Finance Institutions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Mortgages"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Financial Crises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crisis Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic & financial crises & disasters"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banking crises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crisis resolution"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Crisis management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Argentina"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","A common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias."]