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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788133703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Stump David J."]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Conceptual change and the philosophy of science : alternative interpretations of the a priori / / David J. Stump"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"New York : , : Routledge, , 2015"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-317-49537-3"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-138-34669-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-315-71258-X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (195 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"501"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Science -- Philosophy"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"\"\"8 On the Role of Mathematics in Physical Theory\"\"\"\"9 Epilogue: A Pragmatic Theory of the Constitutive Elements in Science\"\"; \"\"Index\"\""]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","In this book, David Stump traces alternative conceptions of the a priori in the philosophy of science and defends a unique position in the current debates over conceptual change and the constitutive elements in science. Stump emphasizes the unique epistemological status of the constitutive elements of scientific theories, constitutive elements being the necessary preconditions that must be assumed in order to conduct a particular scientific inquiry. These constitutive elements, such as logic, mathematics, and even some fundamental laws of nature, were once taken to be a priori knowledge but ca"]