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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910785536103321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Hurley Paul (Paul E.)"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Beyond consequentialism [[electronic resource] /] / by Paul Hurley"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Oxford, : Oxford University Press, 2011"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-283-58218-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786613894632"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-157178-4"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (288 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"171.5"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Consequentialism (Ethics)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Pragmatism"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Philosophy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Philosophy & Religion"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Ethics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Originally published: 2009."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Hurley sets out a radical challenge to consequentialism, the theory which might seem to be the default option in contemporary moral philosophy. There is an unresolved tension within the theory: if consequentialists are right about the content of morality, then morality cannot have the rational authority that even they take it to have."]