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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910781889003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Serena Chad C"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"A revolution in military adaptation [[electronic resource] ] : the US Army in the Iraq War / / Chad C. Serena"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C., : Georgetown University Press, 2011"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-58901-800-1"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (453 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"956.7044/340973"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Strategic culture - United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Organizational change"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Organizational effectiveness"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Decisions in the post-Cold War period -- The transformation of the U.S. Army -- The invasion of Iraq and compelled adaptation -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational inputs -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational outputs and learning -- The U.S. Army and the post-9/11 international security environment in perspective."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US A"]