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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910780292003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Haji Ishtiyaque"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Deontic morality and control / / Ishtiyaque Haji [[electronic resource]]"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-107-12582-0"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-521-03918-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-14776-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-04556-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-49879-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-280-43408-2"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-17743-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-30501-X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xiv, 288 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Cambridge studies in philosophy"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"123/.5"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Free will and determinism"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Ethics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Duty"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. 272-281)  and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Two Parallel Riddles -- Primary Goals -- Prospectus -- Determinism and Deontic Morality -- Obligation and Control -- Fundamentals of Moral Obligation -- 'Can' and Obligation -- Frankfurt-Type Cases and Deontic Control -- Frankfurt-Type Examples -- A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Wrong Actions -- Principle CK and Wrongness -- The Plausibility of Principles CK and WC -- A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Deontic Morality -- An Alternative Argument -- Control Requirements of Deontic Anchors: Some Objections -- Objections to K and Replies -- Frankfurt-Type Cases and K -- A Widerkerian Objection against K -- An Objection from Counterintuitiveness -- Fischer against K -- A Direct Threat against K from Frankfurt-Type Examples -- Self-Imposed Impossibility and K -- Pereboom on OW -- Genuine Moral Dilemmas and OW -- Yaffe on K -- Determinism and Deontic Anchors -- The Consequence Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Alternative Possibilities -- Some Objections and Replies -- Why Determinism Undermines Deontic Anchors -- Objections to the New Incompatibility Thesis and Replies -- "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Saka on 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Determinism -- Indeterminism and Deontic Morality -- Transition: From Determinism to Indeterminism -- Synopsis -- R-Libertarianism -- Modest Meleian Libertarianism -- An Objection and a Reply -- Modest Meleian Libertarianism and Deontic Anchors -- Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and Luck -- Robust Modest R-Libertarianism -- Robust R-Libertarianism and the Luck Objection."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified."]