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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910779004003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Moosbrugger Lorelei K"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"The vulnerability thesis [[electronic resource] ] : interest group influence and institutional design / / Lorelei K. Moosbrugger"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"New Haven, : Yale University Press, c2012"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-280-77053-8"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786613681300"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-300-16758-X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (288 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"322.4/3"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Majorities"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Pressure groups"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Representative government and representation"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Interest Group Influence And Institutional Design -- 2. The Vulnerability Thesis -- 3. Evidence From The Environment -- 4. The European Union -- 5. The United Kingdom: Minority Influence And Majority Rule -- 6. Germany: The Politics Of Paying The Polluter -- 7. Austria: Political Cover And Policy Choice -- 8. Sweden: Minority Representation And The Majority Interest -- 9. Institutional Design And The Quality Of Democracy -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The \"vulnerability thesis\" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union."]