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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910703320203321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Rogoff Kenneth"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles / / Kenneth Rogoff, Anne Sibert"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cambridge, Mass, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986"]
[{"$nulls":4},"[Washington, D.C.] : , : [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System], , [1985]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource : illustrations (black and white);"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"NBER working paper series ; no. w1838"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Elections - Economic aspects"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","February 1986."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-36)."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle."]