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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910693430803321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Terrill W. Andrew"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Escalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"[Place of publication not identified], : Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College, 2009"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xiii, 112 pages)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"956.04/8"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Escalation (Military science) - 1967-1973"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Deterrence (Strategy)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Arab-Israeli conflict"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Persian Gulf War, 1991"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Military & Naval Science"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Law, Politics & Government"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Military Science - General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Middle East Strategic aspects"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-112)."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts."]