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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910522934203321"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Web and Internet Economics : 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings / / edited by Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2022"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"3-030-94676-2"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed. 2022.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (563 pages)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI, , 2946-1642 ; ; 13112"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"380.1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"303.4833"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Algorithms"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Artificial intelligence"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic commerce"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Data structures (Computer science)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Information theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Application software"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Computer science - Mathematics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Design and Analysis of Algorithms"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Artificial Intelligence"]
[{"$nulls":4},"e-Commerce and e-Business"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Data Structures and Information Theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Computer and Information Systems Applications"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Mathematics of Computing"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Mechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division ofmulti-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies."]