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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910464359103321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Messmacher Miguel"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Sovereign insurance and program design [[electronic resource] ] : what is optimal for the sovereign? / / prepared by Miguel Messmacher"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-1248-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-8647-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-283-51558-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4519-0860-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786613828033"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (30 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/64"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Insurance - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Moral hazard - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"International finance - Econometric models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"March 2006.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"\"\"Contents\"\"; \"\"I. INTRODUCTION\"\"; \"\"II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE\"\"; \"\"III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE\"\"; \"\"IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER\"\"; \"\"V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY\"\"; \"\"VI. CONCLUSIONS\"\"; \"\"VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS\"\"; \"\"REFERENCES\"\""]