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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910464006203321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Ivaschenko Iryna"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Corporate governance reforms in the EU : do they matter and how? / / Iryna Ivaschenko and Petya Koeva Brooks"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"[Washington, District of Columbia] : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2008"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-5075-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-6952-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84046-0"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4519-8325-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612840463"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (31 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[{"$nulls":4},"IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/91"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"338.6094"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Corporate governance - Europe"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Corporate governance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; I. Introduction; II. National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms; A. National Reforms; B. EU Reforms; III. Measuring the Private Value of Control; IV. Data and Methodology; A. Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics; B. Empirical Strategy; V. Main Findings; A. Voting Premiums Across Time and Countries; B. Have Reforms Reduced the Private Benefits of Control?; C. Have Reforms Brought About Convergence in Corporate Control?; VI. Conclusions; References; Tables; 1. Italy: National Corporate Reform; 2. Germany: National Corporate Governance Reforms"]
[{"$nulls":4},"3. France: National Corporate Governance Reforms4. EU Corporate Governance Reforms; 5. Number of Dual-Class Firms by Country; 6. Voting Premium: Summary Statistics; 7. Voting Premiums Year Effects; 8. Voting Premium Distributed Year Effects; 9. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, by Year; 10. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms Compared to Control Groups: A Summary; 11. Voting Premiums: Year Effects, Accounting for Product Market Reforms"]
[{"$nulls":4},"12. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, Accounting for Product Market Reforms, by Year13. Distribution Characteristics of Voting Premiums, Pooled for All EU Countries; Figures; 1. Dynamic of the Voting Premiums Acorss Countries, 1992-2007; 2. Reform Efforts: Number of Important Corporate Governance Reforms Per Year; 3. Number of National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms; 4. Convergence in Voting Premiums Across Countries; 5. Distribution of Voting Premium Across EU Countries, by Year"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This paper proposes a new approach to quantifying the effects of corporate governance reforms, by focusing on the dynamics of the voting premiums, a measure of the private benefits of control in a corporation. The results indicate that the reforms have been successful in reducing the voting premiums EU-wide. Moreover, more intense and broad reform efforts (such as introducing national reforms beyond and above the EU-wide initiatives) bring higher and longer lasting benefits. Our findings also suggest that the market for corporate control in Europe has become more integrated, as illustrated by"]