{"text_format":"2","workbook":"xls","n_sheets":1,"sheets":["report2"],"not_rendered":{"charts":0,"images":0,"macros":0,"external_links":1,"defined_names":1,"comments":0,"pivot_tables":0},"unopened":[],"bounds":{"document_bytes":16777216,"sheet_cells":100000,"run_cost":"one","rows_first":2000,"rows_last":500,"rows_between":2000,"halvings":0,"cell_chars":16384,"cell_head_chars":4096},"cells_cut":0,"cells_raw":0,"read":"whole","date_system":"1900","formulas":"cached_only"}

{"sheet":"report2","index":0,"n_rows":23,"n_cols":5,"rows_kept":23,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,2,0,3],[0,4,0,5],[1,2,1,3],[1,4,1,5],[2,2,2,3],[2,4,2,5],[3,2,3,3],[4,2,4,3],[9,2,9,3],[10,2,10,3],[11,2,11,3],[14,2,14,3],[15,2,15,3],[19,2,19,3]],"flags":["formulas_cached_only"]}
[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910463602603321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Masciandaro Donato <1961->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Financial supervisory independence and accountability [[electronic resource] ] : exploring the determinants / / prepared by Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn, and Michael Taylor"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C., : International Monetary Fund, : IMF Institute, 2008"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-3763-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-6522-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-7005-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612840982"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84098-3"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (36 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/147"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Finance - State supervision"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and banking, Central - State supervision"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"June 2008.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34)."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; I. Introduction; II. Background; III. Analysis of Independence and Accountability Indices; A. Sample and Methodology; B. Main Findings; Tables; 1. Ratings on Supervisory Independence and Accountability, and on Independence in Monetary Policy; Figures; 1. Scatter Plot of Independence and Accountabilty Ratings; C. A Look into the Individual Criteria; 2. Spread Between Independence and Accountability Ratings; D. Location Has an Impact; 2. Governance Ratings by Location of Supervisor and Standard Deviation of Ratings in Italics; IV. The determinants of supervisory governance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"A. The Econometric ApproachB. Model to be Tested; C. The Results; 3. Ordered Logit Estimates with Total Governance as the Dependent Variable; 4. Ordered Logit Estimates with Independence as the Dependent Variable; 5. Ordered Logit Estimates with Accountability as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusions; Appendixes; I. Countries Selected for the Survey; II. Ratings by Criteria Across the Sample; III. Definition and Sources of Variables; IV. Correlation Matrix of Variables; References"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and "]
[{"$nulls":4},"accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the superv"]