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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910461390503321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Resh William G. <1973->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Rethinking the administrative presidency : trust, intellectual capital, and appointee-careerist relations in the George W. Bush administration. / / William G. Resh"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Baltimore, Maryland : , : Johns Hopkins University Press, , 2015"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2015"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4214-1850-9"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (209 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Johns Hopkins Studies in American Public Policy and Management"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"353.032"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Executive power - United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Administrative agencies - United States - Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Executive departments - United States - Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Trust - Political aspects - United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States Politics and government 2001-2009"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"The \"Black Box\" of the Administrative Presidency -- Trust, Intellectual Capital,and the Administrative Presidency -- Connecting Trust to Intellectual Capital through the Multileveled Environment of the Executive Branch -- Appointee-Careerist Relations and Trickle-Down Trust : The Joist-Building Power of Stratified Trust on the Federal Workforce -- Encapsulated Interest and Explicit Knowledge Exchange: A Case Study of Presidential Transition -- Rethinking the Administrative Presidency."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","\"While previous works examining presidential control efforts have focused on the \"treatment\" of politicization and associated outcomes, no existing work systematically unpacks the \"black box\" of organizational behavior that facilitates the connection between politicization and performance. Trust, Intellectual Capital, and the Administrative Presidency rigorously analyzes the simple, yet important, argument that presidents typically start from a premise of distrust when they attempt to control agencies. Trust is a critical subject for analysis in studies of presidential control of the bureaucracy. Focusing on the George W. Bush administration, Resh discusses the importance of understanding the link between "]
[{"$nulls":4},"politicization and trust and how a decline in trust can lead to harmful agency failure (e.g., 9/11, Hurricane Katrina). Threaded throughout the book is the creative and appropriate \"Joists vs. Jigsaws\" metaphor that keeps the main argument of the book at the forefront of the reader's mind: mutual support based on optimistic trust is a more effective managerial strategy than fragmentation founded on unsubstantiated distrust\"--"]
[{"$nulls":4},"\"Why do presidents face so many seemingly avoidable bureaucratic conflicts? And why do these clashes usually intensify toward the end of presidential administrations, when a commander-in-chief's administrative goals tend to be more explicit and better aligned with their appointed leadership's prerogatives? In  Rethinking the Administrative Presidency, William G. Resh considers these complicated questions from an empirical perspective.Relying on data drawn from surveys and interviews, Resh rigorously analyzes the argument that presidents typically start from a premise of distrust when they attempt to control federal agencies. Focusing specifically on the George W. Bush administration, Resh explains how a lack of trust can lead to harmful agency failure. He explores the extent to which the Bush administration was able to increase the reliability--and reduce the cost--of information to achieve its policy goals through administrative means during its second term.Arguing that President Bush's use of the administrative presidency created trust between appointees and career executives to increase knowledge sharing throughout respective agencies, Resh demonstrates that functional relationships between careerists and appointees help to advance robust policy. He employs a \"joists vs. jigsaws\" metaphor to stress his main point: that mutual support based on optimistic trust is a more effective managerial strategy than fragmentation founded on unsubstantiated distrust\"--"]