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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910458160203321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Schofield Norman <1944->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Architects of political change : constitutional quandaries and social choice theory / / Norman Schofield [[electronic resource]]"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2006"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-107-16071-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-280-48012-2"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-22046-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-22097-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-21897-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-31620-8"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-60689-3"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-511-21965-2"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xiv, 317 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Political economy of institutions and decisions"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"320.97301"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Political science - Economic aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Social choice - Political aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Constitutional history - United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Elections - Mathematical models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States Politics and government Philosophy"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Constitutional quandaries and social choice -- Power and social choice -- Franklin and the War of Independence -- Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet -- Lincoln and the Civil War -- Johnson and the critical realignment of 1964 -- Keynes and the Atlantic constitution -- Preferences and beliefs -- Political change."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to "]
[{"$nulls":4},"prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798-1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860."]