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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910458067803321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Krishna Vijay"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-281-05230-2"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786611052300"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-08-047596-5"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (318 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"381.1701"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Auctions - Mathematical models"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Game theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-297) and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (\"\"Linkage\"\") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information.  His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions "]
[{"$nulls":4},"and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.*The standard re"]