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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910455486703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Nathan N. M. L."]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"The price of doubt / / N.M.L. Nathan"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2001"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-134-56746-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-280-33555-6"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-203-46821-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-203-24561-X"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (188 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"International library of philosophy"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"121/.5"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Belief and doubt"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Consciousness"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-173) and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Book Cover; Title; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; Arguments for ignorance and the negation test; Demonic arguments; Regressive arguments; Evidence-or-acquaintance arguments; Anti-idealism; Arguments against justified belief; From rational action to rational belief; Arguments against rational belief; The affirmation test; Appendix: Semantic objections to demonic arguments; Notes; Works cited; Index"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","\"An argument may fail because it is unsound. A trivial conclusion is another fault. Do all the sceptic's arguments have one or both of these deficiencies? This book conjectures that they do. Some sceptical arguments are entirely sound. Some have non-trivial conclusions. But none, it is conjectured, has both of these advantages.\""]