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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910455234403321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Plantinga Alvin"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Warrant and proper function / / Alvin Plantinga"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"New York, : Oxford University Press, 1993"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-282-32813-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612328138"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xii, 243 pages)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"121/.6"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"PSYCHOLOGY"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Cognitive Psychology"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Knowledge, Theory of"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Belief and doubt"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Cognition"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Philosophy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Philosophy & Religion"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Speculative Philosophy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning  of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology."]