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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910452347603321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Murphy David E. <1921->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"What Stalin knew [[electronic resource] ] : the enigma of Barbarossa / / David E. Murphy"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"New Haven, : Yale University Press, c2005"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-281-72226-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786611722265"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-300-13026-0"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (340 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"940.54/217"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"World War, 1939-1945 - Campaigns - Eastern Front"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[{"$nulls":4},"Soviet Union Politics and government 1936-1953"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. [275]-299) and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Front matter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Sources -- Introduction: Stalin's Absolute Control, Misconceptions, and Disastrous Decisions -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Chapter 1. Stalin versus Hitler: Background -- Chapter 2. The Outspoken General: Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov -- Chapter 3. Proskurov Sets Stalin Straight -- Chapter 4. Soviet Borders Move Westward -- Chapter 5. The Finns Fight: Proskurov Made a Scapegoat -- Chapter 6. Soviet Military Intelligence Residencies in Western Europe -- Chapter 7. Soviet Military Intelligence Residencies in Eastern Europe -- Chapter 8. Who Were You, Dr. Sorge? Stalin Never Heard of You. -- Chapter 9. NKVD Foreign Intelligence -- Chapter 10. Fitin's Recruited Spies -- Chapter 11. Listening to the Enemy -- Chapter 12. Working on the Railroad -- Chapter 13. The Border Troops Knew -- Chapter 14. Proskurov Is Fired -- Chapter 15. Golikov and Operation Sea Lion -- Chapter 16. ''We Do Not Fire on German Aircraft in Peacetime'' -- Chapter 17. German Deception: Why Did Stalin Believe It? -- Chapter 18. Secret Letters -- Chapter 19. The Purges Revived -- Chapter 20. On the Eve -- Chapter 21. A Summer of Torture -- Chapter 22. The Final Reckoning -- Conclusion: Will the Future Be a Repeat of the Past? -- Appendix 1: Organization and Functions of Soviet Military Intelligence -- Appendix 2: Hitler's Letters to Stalin -- Appendix 3: Those Executed without Trial on October 28, 1941 -- Appendix 4: Chronology of Agent Reporting -- "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Glossary of Spies and Their Masters -- Notes -- Index"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This extensively researched book illuminates many of the enigmas that have surrounded the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, offering keen insights into Stalin's thinking and the reasons for his catastrophic blunder. \"If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22-comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here-its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . . Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider's grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used-or not.\"-Niall Ferguson, New York Times Book Review \"A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler's invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented.\"-Henry A. Kissinger"]