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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910418059103321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Ippolito Dario"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"L’esprit des droits : Montesquieu et le pouvoir de punir / / Dario Ippolito"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Lyon, : ENS Éditions, 2019"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"979-1-03-620065-6"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (134 p.)"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Philosophy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Law (General)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Montesquieu"]
[{"$nulls":4},"droit pénal"]
[{"$nulls":4},"philosophie du droit"]
[{"$nulls":4},"droits fondamentaux"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Lumières"]
[{"$nulls":4},"criminal law"]
[{"$nulls":4},"legal philosophy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"fundamental rights"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Enlightenment"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Francese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","« C’est de la bonté des lois criminelles que dépend principalement la liberté des citoyens. » Par sa critique des interdictions exorbitantes, des châtiments disproportionnés, des accusations invérifiables et des jugements arbitraires, Montesquieu nous apprend que le conflit entre individu et autorité n’est jamais plus dramatique et plus aigu que sur le terrain de la pénalité. Le pouvoir de punir est certes indispensable à la protection de nos droits, mais en les protégeant des violations qui les menacent, il menace lui aussi de les violer. Quelles limites assigner aux prohibitions légitimes ? Dans quel but et comment punir les transgresseurs ? Comment s’assurer de la violation des normes juridiques et de la responsabilité personnelle d’une action criminelle ? Envisagé dans la perspective de la philosophie du droit, L’Esprit des lois révèle sa puissante dimension normative et ouvre l’horizon du « garantisme pénal ».  “It is on the goodness of criminal laws that the "]
[{"$nulls":4},"liberty of the subject principally depends.” By criticising outrageous prohibitions, disproportionate punishments, unverifiable accusations and arbitrary judgments, Montesquieu teaches us that the conflict between the individual and authority is never more dramatic and more acute than with regard to punishment. While the power to punish is certainly indispensable in protecting our rights, it itself constitutes a threat to the very rights that it aims to protect from possible violations. What limits should there be on legitimate prohibitions? Why and how should wrongdoers be punished? How can we identify with certainty any infringement of the law and personal liability for a criminal action? Formulated from the legal philosophy angle, >The Spirit of the Laws reveals its powerful normative dimension and opens up the perspective of “penal guaranteeism”."]