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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910345150403321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Croley Steven P. <1965->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Regulation and public interests : the possibility of good regulatory government / / Steven P. Croley"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Princeton, : Princeton University Press, c2008"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-282-08673-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612086731"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4008-2814-7"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[Course Book]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (391 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"352.801"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Administrative law - Economic aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Social choice"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Trade regulation"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Front matter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction. An Uneasy Commitment to Regulatory Government -- PART I. THE CYNICAL VIEW OF REGULATORY GOVERNMENT, AND ITS ALTERNATIVES -- Chapter One. The Basic Project -- Chapter Two. The Cynical View of Regulation -- Chapter Three. Is Regulatory Capture Inevitable? -- Chapter Four. Alternative Visions of Regulatory Government -- PART II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY STATE -- INTRODUCTION TO PART 2 -- Chapter Five. Opening the Black Box: Regulatory Decision making in Legal Context -- Chapter Six. Regulatory Government as Administrative Government -- Chapter Seven. Participation in Administrative Decision making -- Chapter Eight. The Administrative-Process Approach Expanded: A More Developed Picture -- PART III. PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION -- INTRODUCTION TO PART 3 -- Chapter Nine. The Environmental Protection Agency's Ozone and Particulate Matter Rules -- Chapter Ten. The Food and Drug Administration's Tobacco Initiative -- Chapter Eleven. The Forest Service's Roadless Policy for National Forests -- Chapter Twelve. Socially Beneficial Administrative Decision making: Additional Evidence -- PART IV. PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS -- INTRODUCTION TO PART 4 -- Chapter Thirteen. The Public Choice Theory Revisited -- Chapter Fourteen. The Promise of an Administrative-Process Orientation -- Chapter Fifteen. Regulatory "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Rents, Regulatory Failures, and Other Objections -- Conclusion. The Regulatory State and Social Welfare -- Notes -- Index"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Not since the 1960's have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970's, \"deregulation\" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests. Unlike previous accounts, Regulation and Public Interests takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments, enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits (while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations even over the objections of Congress and influential interest groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory government. Its illustrative case studies include the development of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service's \"roadless\" policy for national forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission."]