{"text_format":"2","workbook":"xls","n_sheets":1,"sheets":["report2"],"not_rendered":{"charts":0,"images":0,"macros":0,"external_links":1,"defined_names":1,"comments":0,"pivot_tables":0},"unopened":[],"bounds":{"document_bytes":16777216,"sheet_cells":100000,"run_cost":"one","rows_first":2000,"rows_last":500,"rows_between":2000,"halvings":0,"cell_chars":16384,"cell_head_chars":4096},"cells_cut":0,"cells_raw":0,"read":"whole","date_system":"1900","formulas":"cached_only"}

{"sheet":"report2","index":0,"n_rows":24,"n_cols":5,"rows_kept":24,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,2,0,3],[0,4,0,5],[1,2,1,3],[1,4,1,5],[2,2,2,3],[2,4,2,5],[3,2,3,3],[5,2,5,3],[7,2,7,3],[8,2,8,3],[9,2,9,3],[10,2,10,3],[11,2,11,3],[13,2,13,3],[14,2,14,3],[16,2,16,3]],"flags":["formulas_cached_only"]}
[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910297042603321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Rittaler Jan B"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Industrial Concentration and the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis : A Critical Evaluation on the Basis of Effective Competition"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Frankfurt am Main : , : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, , 1989"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©1989"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9783631753880"]
[{"$nulls":4},"3631753888"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[First edition.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (422)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Hohenheimer volkswirtschaftliche Schriften."]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"338.8"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Law and economics"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Cover -- Introduction: Antitrust Economics, Policy, and Law at the Crossroads: A Reorientation -- I. The Context -- II. Developments in U.S. Antitrust Policy During the 1970s and 1980s -- 1. Antitrust Economics -- 2. Antitrust Enforcement -- a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice -- b. The Federal Trade Commission -- 3. Antitrust Adjudication -- 4. Antitrust Legislation -- III. The Source of Reorientation: The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis -- 1. The Foundations -- 2. Chicago Antitrust Philosophy -- IV. Definition of the Field of Research and Course of Inquiry -- Part 1: Analytical Framework for the Evaluation of Restraints of Competition by Industrial Concentration -- I. Free Enterprise System. Competition, and Public Policy -- 1. Economic Order and Competition -- 2. Nature and Meaning of Competition -- 3. Competition and Public Policy -- II. Economic Evaluation of Industrial Concentration: Theoretical Approach and Public Policy -- 1. Antitrust Policy Objectives -- a. Objectives and Interrelations -- b. Conflicting Objectives -- 2. Elements of the Approach to an Evaluation of Industrial Concentration -- a. Models of Competition -- b. The Structure-, Conduct-, Performance-Paradigm, and the Competitive Process -- c. Effective Competition and Competition Impairment -- d. Intensity of Competition and the Adequate Test -- 3. The Treatment of Competition Impairment and Public Policy Alternatives -- a. Approaches -- b. Rules -- III. Competition and Industrial Concentration -- 1. Concentration and "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic Theory -- a. Nature and Meaning of Economic Concentration -- b. Economic Concentration and Power -- c. Features of Industrial Concentration -- aa. Significance -- bb. Causes -- cc. Effects -- d. Forms of Industrial Concentration -- aa. Internal Growth -- bb. External Growth -- (1) Horizontal Mergers -- (2) Vertical Mergers."]
[{"$nulls":4},"(3) Conglomerate Mergers -- 2. Measurement of Industrial Concentration -- a. Analysis of Industrial Concentration -- b. Defining the Relevant Market -- c. Measures of Industrial Concentration -- IV. Concluding Remarks -- Part 2: The Central Elements of the Current Theoretical Edifice -- I. The Current Debate on The Goals of Antitrust: Economics or Sociopolitics? -- 1. The Current Efficiency-Orientation -- 2. Evidence of the Goals of Antitrust -- a. Legislative History of the Antitrust Statutes -- b. Adjudicative Development -- c. Plausibility Considerations -- 3. Antitrust Legislation and Rent-Seeking Behavior -- 4. The German Case -- II. Methodology and Theoretical Model Underlying the Evaluation of the Competitiveness of Mergers -- 1. The General Methodology of Analysis -- a. Neoclassical Price Theory as an Instrument of Analysis -- b. Price/Quantity-Interrelations as Indicators of Consumer Welfare -- c. The General Methodology: Conclusions -- 2. Mergers, Efficiency, and the Model for Evaluation -- a. Consumer Welfare and Efficiency: Remarks on Interdependence -- b. The Incorporation of Current Efficiency Considerations -- c. The Partial Equilibrium Trade-Off Model Reconsidered -- d. Qualifications to the Model -- aa. Premises and Assumptions -- bb. General Welfare Measurement -- cc. Allocative Efficiency -- dd. Productive Efficiency -- ee. Transfer of Wealth -- III. Impediments to New Competition -- 1. Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Potential Competition -- 2. The Meaning, Definition, and Importance of Barriers to New Competition -- 3. The Measurement of Barriers to New Competition -- 4. Kinds of Barriers to New Competition and their Sources: Plausibility and Empirical Evidence -- a. Structural Barriers -- aa. Economies of Large Scale -- bb. Absolute Cost Advantages -- cc. Product Differentiation Advantages -- b. Strategic Barriers."]
[{"$nulls":4},"c. Legal and Administrative Barriers -- d. Barriers to Exit -- 5. An Evaluation of Impediments to New Competition -- IV. Concluding Remarks -- Part 3: Industrial Concentration through Horizontal Mergers: Effects on Performance -- I. The Economic Rationale Underlying the Traditional Merger Policy -- 1. The Content of the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine -- 2. Economic Returns as a Standard of Measurement -- 3. Empirical Attempts to Verify the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine -- a. Empirical Evidence -- aa. Concentration and Prices -- bb. Concentration, Profit Rates, and Price-Cost Margins -- b. Collusion and \"Critical Levels\" of Concentration -- c. The Suitability of the Different Performance Criteria -- d. Insufficiencies of Traditional Studies -- II. The Validity of the Mainline Paradigm and the New Learning-Hypothesis -- 1. Efficiency as a Cause of Concentration -- 2. Concentration as a Possible Cause of Collusion -- 3. The Theoretical Basis and the Empirical Evidence of the New Learning-Hypothesis -- 4. Revised Policy Conclusions for Horizontal Mergers -- 5. Critical Evaluation of the New Learning-Hypotheses, the Underlying Premises, and their Empirical Evidence -- a. Impediments to Competition -- b. Accounting Data and the Data Base -- c. The Core of the Oligopoly and Other Omissions -- d. The Persistence of Profits in the Long Run -- III. Firm Market Share as the Essential Determinant of Interfirm Profitability Differences -- 1. Interfirm Profitability Differences: Efficiency or Market Power? -- 2. The Range of Economies of Size as an Alternative Explanatory Approach -- 3. The Evidence of Efficiency on the Basis of Merger Performance -- IV. Concluding "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Remarks -- Part 4: Vertical Mergers: Anticompetitive Effects and the Attainment of Efficiencies -- I. Vertical Integration and Efficiency-Enhancement."]
[{"$nulls":4},"1. Transaction-Costs and Different Mechanisms for the Organization of Economic Exchange -- a. Economic Exchange via Markets: Costs of Using the Price Mechanism -- b. Economic Exchange via Organizations: Costs of Using Internal Organization -- 2. Efficiency-Enhancement as the Underlying Reasoning for Vertical Integration -- 3. Efficiency Gains vs. Anticompetitive Consequences: Necessity for a Trade-Off? -- II. Empirical Evidence on the Extent of Vertical Integration and Associated Efficiency Advantages -- 1. The Measurement of the Extent of Vertical Integration -- 2. The Empirical Evidence on Efficiency-Enhancement -- a. Studies on Transaction-Specific Market Characteristics -- b. Studies on Actual Cost Savings -- 3. A Critical Review of the Applicability of the Transaction-Cost Approach to an Efficiency Analysis of Vertical Integration -- III. An Evaluation of Possible Anticompetitive Consequences Resulting from Vertical Integration -- 1. The Reasoning Underlying Anticipated Anticompetitive Consequences: Foreclosure of Actual and Potential Competitors -- 2. Particular Anticompetitive Effects Associated with Foreclosure -- a. Price and Output Consequences -- b. Price and Supply Squeeze -- c. Price Discrimination -- d. Impediments to New Competition -- e. Collusive Effects -- 3. The Likelihood of Anticompetitive Effects and Revised Policy Conclusions -- IV. Concluding Remarks -- Résumée: Application of the Results of an Analysis of the Chicago School Approach Towards Industrial Concentration -- I. The Legal Treatment of Industrial Concentration -- 1. The Approach -- 2. The Relevant Statutes -- 3. The Merger Term in the Statutes -- 4. The Minimum Thresholds -- 5. The Point of Intervention -- 6. Overall Justification -- II. Trends and Tendencies in Enforcement and Adjudication -- 1. The Use of Economic Evidence in Enforcement and Adjudication."]
[{"$nulls":4},"2. An Evaluation of Trends and Tendencies -- a. Determining Market Delineation -- b. Determining Market Domination -- aa. Superior Market Position -- (1) Market Structure -- (a) Market Share -- (b) Financial Strength -- (c) Market Barriers -- (2) Market Conduct -- bb. Oligopolistic Domination -- c. Strengthening Market Domination -- III. An Evaluation of the Propositions for a Reform of Merger Control in the Fifth Amendment of the ARC -- 1. Political and Economic Order: Thoughts on Structural Complementarity -- 2. The Object of Protection: Competition vs. Competitors -- 3. An Evaluation of the Proposals on the Basis of Our State of Knowledge -- a. The Proposals -- b. The Evaluation -- IV. Concluding Remarks."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","After roughly 15 years of merger control application in the Federal Republic of Germany a <I>reassessment of the significance</I> of this instrument of antitrust policy seems necessary. This is particularly so in view of the <I>reorientation of merger</I> <I>control policy in the United States</I> which has been - in its original version - the model for the German merger control system.<BR> Concerning merger control, the reorientation is characterized by the notion that the <I>structure-conduct-performance paradigm</I> which has dominated U.S. antitrust for a quarter of a century is imprecise or even incorrect and «that bigness in business does not necessarily mean badness.»<BR> This makes the fundamental question arise of whether the German merger control system is still up to date in terms of the underlying market theory and of whether the <I>German Act Against</I> <I>Restraints of Competition</I> needs a reorientation towards aspects of market conduct and performance instead of market structure by means of a Fifth Amendment."]