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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910220125303321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Connable Ben"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"How insurgencies end / / Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, c2010"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-282-79724-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612797248"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-8330-4983-6"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (268 p.)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"355.02/18"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Insurgency"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Counterinsurgency"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-244)."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE - Introduction; Purpose of This Monograph; A Note on Contemporary Threats and Operations; Research Approach; Graphs Used in This Monograph; Conventional Wisdom; How This Monograph Is Organized; CHAPTER TWO - Classifying Outcomes and Selecting Cases; Outcomes; Type I: Government Loss; Type II: Government Victory; Type III: Mixed (Stalemate/Negotiated Settlement); Type IV: Inconclusive or Ongoing Outcome; The Tipping Point: Explanation by Way of Example; Key Indicators: A Note of Caution"]
[{"$nulls":4},"CHAPTER THREE - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Time and External FactorsAssessments of Time and External Factors; Duration of Conflict; Sanctuary Available; Outside Intervention in Support of Government; Outside Intervention in Support of Insurgencies; CHAPTER FOUR - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Internal Factors; Structure; Thailand and the BRN and the P ULO; Urbanization; Uruguay and the Tupamaros; Insurgent Use of Terrorism; Insurgent Strength; System of Government; CHAPTER FIVE - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Other Factors; Force Ratios; Civil-Defense Forces"]
[{"$nulls":4},"CHAPTER SIX - ConclusionsAPPENDIX A - Case Studies: Methodology; APPENDIX B - Supplemental Findings; APPENDIX C - Multivariate Regression Analysis; APPENDIX D - Insurgencies Not Examined for This Publication; APPENDIX E - Categories Used for the Spring 2006 Survey; APPENDIX F - Unavoidable Ambiguities; APPENDIX G - Questions Used for the Autumn 2006 Survey; Glossary; Bibliography"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run."]