{"text_format":"2","workbook":"xls","n_sheets":1,"sheets":["report2"],"not_rendered":{"charts":0,"images":0,"macros":0,"external_links":1,"defined_names":1,"comments":0,"pivot_tables":0},"unopened":[],"bounds":{"document_bytes":16777216,"sheet_cells":100000,"run_cost":"one","rows_first":2000,"rows_last":500,"rows_between":2000,"halvings":0,"cell_chars":16384,"cell_head_chars":4096},"cells_cut":0,"cells_raw":0,"read":"whole","date_system":"1900","formulas":"cached_only"}

{"sheet":"report2","index":0,"n_rows":26,"n_cols":5,"rows_kept":26,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,2,0,3],[0,4,0,5],[1,2,1,3],[1,4,1,5],[2,2,2,3],[2,4,2,5],[3,2,3,3],[5,2,5,3],[6,2,6,3],[7,2,7,3],[8,2,8,3],[18,2,18,3],[19,2,19,3],[23,2,23,3]],"flags":["formulas_cached_only"]}
[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910220076403321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Heginbotham Eric"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"The U.S.-China military scorecard : forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power 1996-2017 / / Eric Heginbotham [et al.]"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Santa Barbara, Ca : , : RAND, , 2015"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2015"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"0-8330-8229-9"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xxxix, 389 pages) : color maps and charts"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"355/.033551"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"National security - China"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National security - United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National security - Pacific Area"]
[{"$nulls":4},"China Strategic aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"China Military policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"China Armed Forces"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States Military policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Spratly Islands Strategic aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taiwan Strategic aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States Armed Forces"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Introduction Different paths: Chinese and U.S. military development, 1996-2017 Scorecard 1: Chinese capability to attack air bases Scorecard 2: air campaigns over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands Scorecard 3: U.S. penetration of Chinese airspace Scorecard 4: U.S. capability to attack Chinese air bases Scorecard 5: Chinese anti-surface warfare Scorecard 6: U.S. anti-surface warfare capabilities versus Chinese naval ships Scorecard 7: U.S. counterspace capabilities versus Chinese space systems Scorecard 8: Chinese counterspace capabilities versus U.S. space systems Scorecard 9: U.S. and Chinese cyberwarfare capabilities Scorecard 10: U.S. and Chinese strategic nuclear stability The receding frontier of U.S. dominance Implications and recommendations"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","\"Over the past two decades, China's People's Liberation Army has transformed itself from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. Its technology and operational proficiency still lag "]
[{"$nulls":4},"behind those of the United States, but it has rapidly narrowed the gap. Moreover, China enjoys the advantage of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios, and geographical advantage would likely neutralize many U.S. military strengths. A sound understanding of regional military issues -- including forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power -- will be essential for establishing appropriate U.S. political and military policies in Asia. This RAND study analyzes the development of respective Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in ten categories of military operations across two scenarios, one centered on Taiwan and one on the Spratly Islands. The analysis is presented in ten scorecards that assess military capabilities as they have evolved over four snapshot years: 1996, 2003, 2010, and 2017. The results show that China is not close to catching up to the United States in terms of aggregate capabilities, but also that it does not need to catch up to challenge the United States on its immediate periphery. Furthermore, although China's ability to project power to more distant locations remains limited, its reach is growing, and in the future U.S. military dominance is likely to be challenged at greater distances from China's coast. To maintain robust defense and deterrence capabilities in an era of fiscal constraints, the United States will need to ensure that its own operational concepts, procurement, and diplomacy anticipate future developments in Chinese military capabilities.\"--Back cover"]