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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910164926603321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Bar-Joseph Uri"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Intelligence success and failure : the human factor / / Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"New York, NY : , : Oxford University Press, , 2017"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"0-19-067699-X"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-067700-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0-19-934175-3"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (281 pages)"]
[null,null,"Classificazione",null,"POL036000POL012000PSY000000"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"355.3432"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Military intelligence - Decision making - Psychological aspects"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Surprise (Military science)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"World War, 1939-1945 - Military intelligence - Soviet Union"]
[{"$nulls":4},"orean War, 1950-1953 - Military intelligence - United States"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Israel-Arab War, 1973 - Military intelligence - Israel"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Includes index."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Machine generated contents note: -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: The Theoretical Framework -- Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion -- Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process -- Part Two: The Empirical Evidence -- The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow -- The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War -- Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War -- Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 -- The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: The Success -- Chapter VI. Conclusions."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","'Intelligence Success and Failure' presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks."]