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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910150185903321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Grauer Ryan <1983->"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Commanding military power : organizing for victory and defeat on the battlefield / / Ryan Grauer"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2016"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-316-68748-1"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-316-68898-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-316-68923-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-316-68948-4"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-316-68973-5"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-316-69048-2"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-316-67017-1"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xiii, 263 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"951.904/24"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Command of troops"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Liaoyang, Battle of, Liaoyang, China, 1904"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Huai Hai Campaign, China, 1948-1949"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Korean War, 1950-1953 - Campaigns - Korea"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Jul 2016)."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Commanding military power -- Liaoyang -- Huai-Hai campaign -- The 5th Phase Offensive -- The 3rd Phase Offensive -- Conclusion."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and "]
[{"$nulls":4},"specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength."]