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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910136933003321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Batto Nathan F"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Mixed-member electoral systems in constitutional context : Taiwan, Japan, and beyond / / edited by Nathan F. Batto, Chi Huang, Alexander C. Tan, and Gary W. Cox"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Ann Arbor : , : University of Michigan Press, , [2016]"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9780472121588"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0472121588"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9780472119738"]
[{"$nulls":4},"0472119737"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (x, 321 pages) : illustrations; digital, PDF file(s)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"New comparative politics"]
[null,null,"Classificazione",null,"POL008000"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"324.6"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Proportional representation - Taiwan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Proportional representation - Japan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Representative government and representation - Taiwan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Representative government and representation - Japan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Political parties - Taiwan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Political parties - Japan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Elections - Taiwan"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Elections - Japan"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Introduction : Legislature-Centric and Executive-Centric Theories of Party Systems and Faction Systems / Nathan F. Batto and Gary W. Cox -- The Consequences of MMM on Party Systems / Chi Huang, Ming-Feng Kuo, and Hans Stockton -- The Consequences of Constitutional Systems on Party Systems / Jih-wen Lin -- LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM / Yoshiaki Kobayashi and Hiroki Tsukiyama -- Executive Competition, Electoral Rules, and Faction Systems in Taiwan / Nathan F. Batto and Hsin-ta Huang -- Innovations in Candidate Selection Methods / Eric Chen-hua Yu, Kaori Shoji, and Nathan F. Batto -- Post Allocation, List Nominations, and Preelectoral Coalitions under MMM / Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia-hung Tsai -- Split-Ticket Voting under MMM / T.Y. Wang, Chang-chih Lin, and Yi-ching Hsiao -- Thailand and the Philippines under MMM / Allen Hicken -- Political Consequences of New Zealand's MMP System in Comparative Perspective / Matthew S. "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Shugart and Alexander C. Tan -- Presidents and Blank Votes in the Bolivian and Russian Mixed-Member Systems / Nathan F. Batto, Henry A. Kim, and Natalia Matukhno -- Conclusions : Mixed-Member Systems Embedded within Constitutional Systems / Chi Huang."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the \"best of both worlds.\" In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system- especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly- can modify the incentives created by the electoral system.  The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context- and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded."]