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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNICAMPANIASUN0118941"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Apushkinskaya, Daria"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Free boundary problems : regularity properties near the fixed boundary / Darya Apushkinskaya"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"XVII, 144 p., : ill. ; 24 cm"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[[Cham] : Springer, 2018]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"Pubblicazione in formato elettronico"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"35R35 - Free boundary problems for PDEs [MSC 2020]"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910162925603321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Delgado-Téllez Mar"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : : An Empirical Analysis of Spain’s Regions / / Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor Lledo, Javier Pérez"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9781475569926"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1475569920"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781475569940"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1475569947"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations, tables"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"330"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economics - Spain"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budgeting"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National Budget"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budget Systems"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt"]
[{"$nulls":4},"State and Local Budget and Expenditures"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Intergovernmental Relations"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Federalism"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Secession"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal Policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Debt"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Debt Management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Sovereign Debt"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Administration"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Sector Accounting and Audits"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budgeting & financial management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Government debt management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal rules"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budget planning and preparation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal consolidation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal risks"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public financial management (PFM)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Debts, Public"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Budget"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Spain"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance  with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is  applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance  among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth  forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control  of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical  fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown  any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel  governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of  intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring  enforcement procedures are politically credible."]