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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNICAMPANIASUN0042103"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"18: Hubatsch-Ingouf / begrundet von Ulrich Thieme und Felix Becker ; unter Mitwirkung von etwa 400 Fachgelehrten bearbeitet und redigiert von H. Vollmer ... [et al.] ; herausgegeben von Hans Vollmer"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Leipzig : E.A. Seemann, [19..]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"600 p. ; 27 cm."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Tedesco"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910219991403321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Hosmer Stephen T"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"The conflict over Kosovo : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / / Stephen T. Hosmer"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"RAND Corporation, 2001"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Santa Monica, Calif. : , : Rand, , 2001"]
[{"$nulls":4},"©2001"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"0-8330-3238-0"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages) : illustrations, charts"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Project Air Force series on Operation Allied Force"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"949.7103"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Kosovo War, 1998-1999"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-155)."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Introduction He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions Damage to \"dual-use\" infrastructure generated growing pressure Damage to military forces and KLA \"resurgence\" generated little pressure He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected He probably also worried about threat of future invasion He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover Concluding observations"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end "]
[{"$nulls":4},"the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations"]