LEADER 01038nam a22002771i 4500 001 991004142959707536 005 20030225115347.0 008 020812s1981 it |||||||||||||||||ita 035 $ab11921432-39ule_inst 035 $aocm00000005$9ExL 040 $aDip.to Filologia Ling. e Lett.$bita$cA.t.i. Arché s.c.r.l. Pandora Sicilia s.r.l. 100 1 $aFielding, Henry$0165921 245 10$aJoseph Andrews /$cHenry Fielding 250 $a3. ed. 260 $aMilano :$bGarzanti,$c1981 300 $aXVIII, 393 p. ;$c17 cm 440 2$aI grandi libri Garzanti 500 $aTrad. di Giorgio Melchiori 700 1 $aMelchiori, Giorgio 765 0 $thistory of the adventures of Joseph Andrews and his friend Mr Abraham Adams 907 $a.b11921432$b02-04-14$c01-04-03 912 $a991004142959707536 945 $aLE008 FL.M. (IN) M 17$g1$iLE008A-04111$lle008$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s- $t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i12192156$z01-04-03 996 $aJoseph Andrews$9183807 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale008$b01-04-03$cm$da $e-$fita$git $h0$i1 LEADER 02949nam 22004815 450 001 9910303445903321 005 20251204111227.0 010 $a981-13-2995-8 024 7 $a10.1007/978-981-13-2995-1 035 $a(CKB)4100000007335135 035 $a(DE-He213)978-981-13-2995-1 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5626981 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000007335135 100 $a20181228d2018 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aProcyclical Fiscal Policy /$fby Toshihiro Ihori, Keigo Kameda 205 $a1st ed. 2018. 210 1$aSingapore :$cSpringer Nature Singapore :$cImprint: Springer,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (XIII, 68 p. 19 illus., 9 illus. in color.) 225 1 $aDevelopment Bank of Japan Research Series,$x2367-0975 311 08$a981-13-2994-X 327 $a1 Numerical Overview of Fiscal Cyclicality -- 2 Theory of Procyclical Fiscal Policy -- 3 Budget Deficits and Income Fluctuation in a Political Economy. 330 $aConventional wisdom dictates that a fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical. However, contrary to this conventional views, recent research has demonstrated that fiscal policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries. In this book, we attempt to propose a new interpretation of this procyclicality after reviewing theoretical and empirical evolution of the research. In particular, by incorporating the political effort behavior of private agents into a weak government model, we explore how income fluctuations affect the optimal budget deficits in a political economy. If the government can control the political behavior, normally, the optimal budget deficit should rise in a recession as a first-best case; however, interestingly, a recession does not necessarily prompt an increase in the budget deficits in a second-best political economy. The response of the budget deficits to income fluctuations mainly depends on the efficiency of political effort, which may correspond to the degree of democracy and bureaucratic efficiency of the governments. We test the prediction of the pro-cyclical fiscal policy and find it applicable for democratic countries with semi-efficient governments including Japan. 410 0$aDevelopment Bank of Japan Research Series,$x2367-0975 606 $aFinance, Public 606 $aAsia$xEconomic conditions 606 $aPublic Economics 606 $aAsian Economics 615 0$aFinance, Public. 615 0$aAsia$xEconomic conditions. 615 14$aPublic Economics. 615 24$aAsian Economics. 676 $a336 700 $aIhori$b Toshihiro$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0140866 702 $aKameda$b Keigo$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910303445903321 996 $aProcyclical Fiscal Policy$92519967 997 $aUNINA