LEADER 04615oam 22012374 450 001 9910956115903321 005 20250426110138.0 010 $a9786613822901 010 $a9781462362912 010 $a1462362915 010 $a9781452782423 010 $a1452782423 010 $a9781282649095 010 $a1282649094 010 $a9781451909692 010 $a1451909691 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443323 035 $a(EBL)3014343 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000941195 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11525486 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941195 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10963488 035 $a(PQKB)10054208 035 $a(OCoLC)698585545 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014343 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006256 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2006256 035 $aWPIEA2006256 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443323 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aGoal-Independent Central Banks : $eWhy Politicians Decide to Delegate /$fChristopher Crowe 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (43 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"November 2006." 311 08$a9781451865165 311 08$a1451865163 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions"" 330 3 $aA motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/256 606 $aBanks and banking, Central 606 $aMonetary policy 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aCentral bank autonomy$2imf 606 $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf 606 $aCentral banks$2imf 606 $aDeflation$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aIncome$2imf 606 $aInflation$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aMultiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models$2imf 606 $aNational accounts$2imf 606 $aNoncooperative Games$2imf 606 $aPersonal income$2imf 606 $aPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions$2imf 606 $aPrice Level$2imf 606 $aPrices$2imf 606 $aSpatial Models$2imf 606 $aTreatment Effect Models$2imf 607 $aSouth Africa$2imf 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central. 615 0$aMonetary policy. 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aCentral bank autonomy 615 7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies 615 7$aCentral banks 615 7$aDeflation 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aIncome 615 7$aInflation 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aMultiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models 615 7$aNational accounts 615 7$aNoncooperative Games 615 7$aPersonal income 615 7$aPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions 615 7$aPrice Level 615 7$aPrices 615 7$aSpatial Models 615 7$aTreatment Effect Models 700 $aCrowe$b Christopher$0868737 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910956115903321 996 $aGoal-Independent Central Banks$94372915 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01058nam a22002891i 4500 001 991003773999707536 005 20250424104114.0 008 031111s1993 it er 001|0 ita 020 $a8842042773 035 $ab12472220-39ule_inst 035 $aARCHE-050550$9ExL 040 $aBibl. Dip.le Aggr. Studi Umanistici - Sez. Lingue$bita$cA.t.i. Arché s.c.r.l. Pandora Sicilia s.r.l.$dSocioculturale Scs 082 04$a821.912$223 100 1 $aCrivelli, Renzo S.$0164696 245 10$aIntroduzione a T. S. Eliot /$cdi Renzo S. Crivelli 246 18$aEliot 260 $aRoma ;$aBari :$bLaterza,$c1993 300 $a222 p. ;$c18 cm 490 1 $aGli scrittori ;$v48 600 14$aEliot, Thomas Stearns 830 4$aGli scrittori ;$v48 907 $a.b12472220$b02-04-14$c13-11-03 912 $a991003773999707536 945 $aLE012 828.91 ELI CRI$g1$i2012000229372$lle012$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s-$t0$u2$v5$w2$x0$y.i12903516$z13-11-03 996 $aIntroduzione a T. S. Eliot$9182088 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale012$b13-11-03$cm$da$e-$fita$git$h0$i1