LEADER 01241nam a2200397 i 4500 001 991003699039707536 005 20021220115358.0 008 020905s2001 sz ||| | eng 020 $a3764365463 035 $ab11849915-39ule_inst 035 $aLE01313609$9ExL 040 $aDip.to Matematica$beng 082 0 $a515 084 $aAMS 28A80 084 $aAMS 35P 084 $aAMS 42B 084 $aAMS 42C40 084 $aAMS 46E35 084 $aAMS 46E45 084 $aAMS 47B06 100 1 $aTriebel, Hans$040793 245 14$aThe structure of functions /$cHans Triebel 260 $aBasel ; Boston ; Berlin :$bBirkhauser,$cc2001 300 $axii, 425 p. ;$c24 cm 490 0 $aMonographs in mathematics ;$v97 500 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index 650 4$aFractals 650 4$aFunction spaces 650 4$aSobolev spaces 650 4$aWavelets (Mathematics) 907 $a.b11849915$b28-04-17$c20-12-02 912 $a991003699039707536 945 $aLE013 46E TRI14 (2001)$g1$i2013000131771$lle013$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s- $t0$u2$v0$w2$x0$y.i12102489$z20-12-02 996 $aStructure of functions$9377741 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale013$b01-01-02$cm$da $e-$feng$gsz $h4$i1 LEADER 04357nam 2200589 450 001 9910819394003321 005 20230807205620.0 010 $a1-78348-596-5 035 $a(CKB)3710000000539191 035 $a(EBL)4206131 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001691050 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16540129 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001691050 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)15048688 035 $a(PQKB)25079745 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4206131 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000539191 100 $a20160123h20152015 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBanking union as a shock absorber $elessons for the eurozone from the US /$fDaniel Gros and Ansgar Belke 210 1$aBrussels :$cCentre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),$d[2015] 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (93 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-78348-594-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aBanking Union as a Shock Absorber; TABLE OF CONTENTS; List of Abbreviations ; Preface ; 1. Introduction and motivation ; 2. The macroeconomic stabilisation properties of a banking union: Some case studies ; 2.1 Regional concentration of real estate cycles within a monetary union ; 2.2 Ireland vs Nevada 327 $a2.3 Florida: Another example of the US banking union in action 2.4 Nevada vs Latvia ; 3. Foreign-owned banks: A banking union substitute? The EU experience ; 4. Who pays for the shock absorbers ; 4.1 FDIC ; 4.2 Securitisation via US federal housing-market institutions 327 $a4.3 Other (private label) securitisation 4.4 Who pays in the end? The incidence of taxes in a competitive industry; 5. What to expect from the European banking union ; 6. Open issues for banking union ; 6.1 Can the SRF survive without a fiscal backstop?; 6.2 How to discourage risk-taking via the contributions to the SRF 327 $a6.3 Separating resolution and deposit insurance: Principles of a two-tier European deposit (re)insurance system 6.4 Basic principles of reinsurance ; 6.4.1 Compulsory reinsurance with a deductible ; 6.4.2 Premiums and management ; 6.4.3 Transition 327 $a7. General considerations: Fiscal union and financial shock absorber 8. Concluding remarks ; References ; Index 330 $aThis study investigates the shock-absorbing properties of a banking union. It makes a detailed comparison between the way in which banking unions have absorbed regional financial shock at the federal level in the USA, but have led to severe regional (national) financial dislocation and tensions in Europe, particularly within the Eurozone. 606 $aBanks and banking$zUnited States$xHistory$y21st century 606 $aBanks and banking$zEurope$xHistory$y21st century 607 $aUnited States$xEconomic conditions$y21st century 607 $aEurope$xEconomic conditions$y21st century 615 0$aBanks and banking$xHistory 615 0$aBanks and banking$xHistory 676 $a332.1/10973 700 $aGros$b Daniel$0125725 702 $aBelke$b Ansgar 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819394003321 996 $aBanking union as a shock absorber$94049595 997 $aUNINA