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Pandora Sicilia s.r.l. 041 0 $alatgre 082 04$a480.09 100 1 $aOroz Reta, José$0454364 245 10$aThesauramata philologica Iosepho Orozio oblata 260 $aSalamanca :$bUniversidad pontificia,$c1993-1995 300 $a3 v. ;$c24 cm 440 0$aHelmantica : revista de Filología clásica y hebrea ;$v44-46 650 4$aLinguistica 650 4$aFilologia 650 4$aLingua greca 650 4$aLingua latina 700 1 $aHerrera, Maria Rosa 700 1 $aMarcos Casquero, Manuel Antonio 700 1 $aGarcía-Jalón de la Lama, Santiago 907 $a.b12327669$b02-04-14$c08-10-03 912 $a991002708679707536 945 $aLE002 SP 400/044$cV. 1$g1$i2002000123541$lle002$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$so $t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i12727131$z08-10-03 945 $aLE002 SP 400/045$cV. 2$g1$i2002000123534$lle002$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$so $t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i12727143$z08-10-03 945 $aLE002 SP 400/046$cV. 3$g1$i2002000123503$lle002$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$so $t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i12727155$z08-10-03 996 $aThesauramata philologica Iosepho Orozio oblata$9160629 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale002$b08-10-03$cm$da $e-$fmul$gsp $h0$i3 LEADER 05629oam 22012134 450 001 9910971215303321 005 20250426110959.0 010 $a9786612845277 010 $a9781462300259 010 $a1462300251 010 $a9781451962239 010 $a1451962231 010 $a9781282845275 010 $a1282845276 010 $a9781452708683 010 $a1452708681 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055419 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943053 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11523873 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943053 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10975309 035 $a(PQKB)11519156 035 $a(OCoLC)502478206 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2010018 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606075 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2010018 035 $aWPIEA2010018 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055419 100 $a20020129d2010 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aResponding to Banking Crises : $eLessons From Cross-Country Evidence /$fEnrica Detragiache, Giang Ho 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2010. 215 $a31 p 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9781451918670 311 08$a1451918674 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Methodology and Data -- A. Empirical Model -- B. Policy Response Index -- C. Control Variables -- D. The Instrument -- III. The Results -- A. Results from Baseline Specification -- B. Comparison with Other Results in the Literature -- C. Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Controls -- D. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Crisis Performance -- E. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Policy Response Indexes -- F. Fiscal Policy during the Crisis. -- IV. Conclusions -- References -- Text Tables -- 1. Correlation among Crisis Performance Measures -- 2. Construction of the Policy Index -- 3. Crisis Episodes, Policy Response, and Political System -- 4. Cross-Correlations between Political System and Crisis Policies -- 5. Baseline Results -- 6. Additional Control Variables -- 7. Alternative Measures of Crisis Performance -- 8. Alternative Policy Indexes -- 9. Fiscal Policy Response and Political System -- Figure 1. Distribution of Policy Index -- Appendix Tables -- A1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources -- A2. Summary Statistics -- A3. Cross Correlations among Variables. 330 3 $aA common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2010/018 606 $aFinancial crises 606 $aBanks and banking 606 $aBanking crises$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf 606 $aCrisis Management$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aCrisis resolution$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial Markets and the Macroeconomy$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 607 $aArgentina$2imf 615 0$aFinancial crises. 615 0$aBanks and banking. 615 7$aBanking crises 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies 615 7$aCrisis Management 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aCrisis resolution 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aFinancial Markets and the Macroeconomy 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aPublic Finance 676 $a338.29125 700 $aDetragiache$b Enrica$0120810 701 $aHo$b Giang$01816036 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910971215303321 996 $aResponding to Banking Crises$94371679 997 $aUNINA