LEADER 00875nam a2200253 i 4500 001 991002343169707536 005 20020503164257.0 008 000704s1977 ||| ||| | ||| 035 $ab10350937-39ule_inst 035 $aEXGIL102381$9ExL 040 $aBiblioteca Interfacoltà$bita 100 1 $aConrieri, Davide$0203189 245 10$aD'Ancona Croce /$ca cura di Davide Conrieri ; introduzione di Mario Fubini 260 $c1977 300 $aXXX, 289 p. 490 0 $aCarteggio D'Ancona ;$v4 700 1 $aFubini, Mario 907 $a.b10350937$b21-02-17$c27-06-02 912 $a991002343169707536 945 $aLE002 858.7 DAN B CON 945 $aLE002 It. XIV M 29$cV. 4$g1$i2002000510075$lle002$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s- $t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i10411513$z27-06-02 996 $aD'Ancona Croce$9204691 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale002$b01-01-00$cm$da $e-$feng$gxx $h0$i1 LEADER 02996nam 2200553 450 001 9910810774803321 005 20230803213330.0 010 $a0-87609-589-9 010 $a0-87609-590-2 035 $a(CKB)3710000000441136 035 $a(EBL)3425956 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001577799 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16253025 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001577799 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14860194 035 $a(PQKB)10957341 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3425956 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000441136 100 $a20150725h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLimiting armed drone proliferation /$fMicah Zenko and Sarah Kreps 210 1$aNew York, New York :$cCouncil on Foreign Relations,$d2014. 210 4$d©2014 215 $a1 online resource (53 p.) 225 1 $aCouncil Special Report ;$vNumber 69 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-87609-588-0 327 $aContents; Foreword; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Drone Proliferation Trends; How Drones Are Different and Can Destabilize; Proliferation Constraints and Incentives; Debates About Armed Drone Exports; Debates About Armed Drone Uses; Conclusions and Recommendations; Endnotes; About the Authors; Advisory Committee for Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation; Center for Preventive Action Advisory Committee; Mission Statement of the Center for Preventive Action; Council Special Reports 330 $a"Though the United States remains the lead actor in terms of possessing and using armed drones, the rest of the world is quickly catching up. Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example, have begun to develop increasingly sophisticated indigenous drone capabilities. Other countries, including Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have publicized their intent to purchase them. The direct consequences of armed drone proliferation on U.S. national security are several years out, but the policymaking decisions that will shape those consequences confront the Obama administration today. How the United States uses armed drones and for what purposes will contribute to the norms that will influence how states use them in the future."--Introduction, page 3. 410 0$aCSR (New York, N.Y.) ;$vNumber 69. 606 $aUninhabited combat aerial vehicles$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 606 $aDrone aircraft$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 615 0$aUninhabited combat aerial vehicles$xGovernment policy 615 0$aDrone aircraft$xGovernment policy 676 $a358.4183 700 $aZenko$b Micah$01620572 702 $aKreps$b Sarah E. 712 02$aCouncil on Foreign Relations, 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810774803321 996 $aLimiting armed drone proliferation$93995510 997 $aUNINA