LEADER 02795nam 2200637 450 001 9910464256003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8156-5162-7 035 $a(CKB)3170000000046823 035 $a(MH)012345874-9 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000605980 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11381845 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000605980 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10579470 035 $a(PQKB)10388269 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4649132 035 $a(OCoLC)794700208 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse9903 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4649132 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11250014 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL946861 035 $a(OCoLC)957437175 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000046823 100 $a20160904h20102010 uy h 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aMissing a beat $ethe rants and regrets of Seymour Krim /$fedited and with an introduction by Mark Cohen ; with a foreword by Dan Wakefield 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aSyracuse, New York :$cSyracuse University Press,$d2010. 210 4$dİ2010 215 $a1 online resource (xxxix, 236 p. )$cill. ; 225 1 $aJudaic Traditions in Literature, Music, and Art 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-8156-0948-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aWhat's this cat's story? -- Milton Klonsky, my favorite intellectual -- The American novel made me -- The 215,000 word habit: Should I give my life to The Times? -- Remembering Harold Rosenberg -- On being an Anglo -- Anti-Jazz: Unless the implications are faced -- Ask for a white Cadillac -- Black English, or The motherfucker culture -- Making It! -- Norman Mailer, get out of my head! -- Mario Puzo and me -- The one & only million-dollar jewboy caper -- For my brothers and sisters in the failure business -- The Menahem begin image -- Sitting shiva for Henry Miller -- My sister, Joyce Brothers -- Epitaph for a Canadian kike. 410 0$aJudaic traditions in literature, music, and art. 606 $aJews$zUnited States$vHumor 606 $aJewish wit and humor 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aJews 615 0$aJewish wit and humor. 676 $a808.882089924 702 $aCohen$b Mark 702 $aWakefield$b Dan 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464256003321 996 $aMissing a beat$92066321 997 $aUNINA 999 $aThis Record contains information from the Harvard Library Bibliographic Dataset, which is provided by the Harvard Library under its Bibliographic Dataset Use Terms and includes data made available by, among others the Library of Congress LEADER 14115nam 22009255 450 001 996466572103316 005 20200706094621.0 010 $a3-319-25594-0 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1 035 $a(CKB)4340000000001176 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001585018 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16265529 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001585018 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14864186 035 $a(PQKB)10857068 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-25594-1 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6295833 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5596481 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5596481 035 $a(OCoLC)932169959 035 $a(PPN)190529164 035 $a(EXLCZ)994340000000001176 100 $a20151111d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#008mamaa 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDecision and Game Theory for Security$b[electronic resource] $e6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings /$fedited by Arman (MHR) Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (X, 371 p. 90 illus. in color.) 225 1 $aSecurity and Cryptology ;$v9406 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a3-319-25593-2 327 $aIntro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- Full Papers -- A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Model and Preliminaries -- 3.1 Virtual Network Model -- 3.2 Adversary Model -- 4 Modeling Interaction with Single Decoy -- 4.1 Timing-Based Decoy Detection Game -- 4.2 Fingerprinting-Based Decoy Detection Game -- 5 Characterization of Optimal IP Address Randomization Strategy by Network -- 5.1 Game Formulation -- 5.2 Optimal Strategy of the System -- 5.3 Optimal Strategy of the Adversary -- 6 Simulation Study -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Works -- 1.2 Organization of the Paper -- 2 Game-Theoretic Model for Cyber Insurance -- 3 Analysis of the Cyber Insurance Model -- 3.1 Separable Utilities -- 3.2 Case Study: Cyber Insurance Under Infection Dynamics -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background: Network Security Games -- 3 Related Work -- 4 Adversary Behavioral Models -- 4.1 The Perfectly Rational Model -- 4.2 The Quantal Response Model -- 4.3 The Subjective Utility Quantal Response Model -- 4.4 The SUQR Graph-Aware Model -- 5 Defender Strategy Generation -- 6 Human Subject Experiments -- 6.1 Experimental Overview -- 6.2 Experiment Data Composition -- 6.3 Data Analysis Metrics -- 7 Predictive Reliability Analysis -- 7.1 SSG Experiment -- 7.2 SSG Predictive Reliability -- 7.3 NSG Predictive Reliability -- 7.4 Training Set Size -- 8 Predictive Reliability Factors -- 8.1 Training Set Feature: EAS -- 9 Graph Features and Their Impacts on Predictive Reliability -- 10 Conclusion -- References -- Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments. 327 $a1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 2.1 Security Economics and Games of Timing -- 2.2 Theoretical Analyses of FlipIt -- 2.3 Behavioral Studies of FlipIt -- 3 Model -- 3.1 Players and Choices -- 3.2 Environment -- 3.3 Consequences -- 4 Analysis -- 5 Numerical Examples -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Prior Work -- 2 The Multi-party FlipIt Model -- 3 Obtaining Nash Equilibria in Continuous Time for a Stochastic Process -- 3.1 Simple Example, FlipThem0F(n,n,d,): Full Threshold, Full Reset -- 3.2 FlipThemF(n,t,d,): (n,t)-Threshold, Full Reset -- 3.3 FlipThemS(n,t,d,): (n,t)-Threshold, Single Reset -- References -- A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Game Model -- 2.1 Basic Model -- 2.2 Defender's Problem -- 2.3 Attacker's Problem -- 3 Best Responses -- 3.1 Defender's Best Response -- 3.2 Attacker's Best Response -- 3.3 Simplified Optimization Problems -- 4 Nash Equilibria -- 5 Sequential Game -- 6 Numerical Result -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Model and Game Formulation -- 3.1 Defender Model -- 3.2 Adversary Model -- 3.3 Game Formulation -- 4 Passivity-Based Distributed Defense Strategy -- 4.1 Distributed Defender Strategy -- 4.2 Passivity-Based Convergence Analysis -- 5 Mitigating Side Information of Adversary -- 5.1 Deviation from Stackelberg Equilibrium -- 5.2 Optimizing the Convergence Rate -- 6 Numerical Study -- 7 Conclusions and Future Work -- References -- Combining Online Learning and Equilibrium Computation in Security Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Game Model -- 3.1 Attacker Behavior Model -- 4 Background -- 4.1 Stackelberg Security Game. 327 $a4.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium -- 4.3 Nash Equilibrium -- 5 Defender Strategies -- 5.1 Online Learning with One Resource -- 5.2 Online Learning with Multiple Resources -- 6 Combined Algorithms -- 6.1 Combined Algorithm 1 -- 6.2 Combined Algorithm 2 -- 6.3 Combined Algorithm 3 -- 6.4 Combined Algorithm 4 -- 7 Experiments -- 7.1 Imprecise Stackelberg Equilibrium Strategy -- 7.2 Performance of Combined Algorithms with One Resource -- 7.3 Combinatorial Combined Algorithms -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Interdependent Security Games Under Behavioral Probability Weighting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Probability Weighting -- 3 Interdependent Security Games -- 4 Total Effort Game with Probability Weighting: Homogeneous Players -- 4.1 Comparative Statics -- 4.2 Social Optimum -- 5 Weakest Link and Best Shot Games -- 6 Total Effort Game with Heterogeneous Players -- 7 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Making the Most of Our Regrets: Regret-Based Solutions to Handle Payoff Uncertainty and Elicitation in Green Security Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Behavioral Modeling Validation -- 3.1 Dataset Description -- 3.2 Learning Results -- 4 Behavioral Minimax Regret (MMRb) -- 5 ARROW Algorithm: Boundedly Rational Attacker -- 5.1 R.ARROW: Compute Relaxed MMRb -- 5.2 M.ARROW: Compute MRb -- 6 ARROW-Perfect Algorithm: Perfectly Rational Attacker -- 6.1 R.ARROW-Perfect: Compute Relaxed MMR -- 6.2 M.ARROW-Perfect: Compute Max Regret -- 7 UAV Planning for Payoff Elicitation (PE) -- 8 Experimental Results -- 8.1 Synthetic Data -- 8.2 Real-World Data -- 9 Summary -- References -- A Security Game Model for Environment Protection in the Presence of an Alarm System -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Problem Formulation -- 3 Finding the Best Signal--Response Strategy -- 3.1 Computing D's actions -- 3.2 A Heuristic Algorithm -- 3.3 Solving SRG--v. 327 $a4 Finding the Best Patrolling Strategy -- 4.1 Computing the Best Placement -- 4.2 Robustness to Missed Detections -- 5 Experimental Evaluation -- 6 Conclusions and Future Research -- References -- Determining a Discrete Set of Site-Constrained Privacy Options for Users in Social Networks Through Stackelberg Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Problem Statement -- 4 Model Overview -- 4.1 User Model -- 4.2 Site Model for the Determination of a Discrete Set of Privacy Options for Shared Content -- 5 An Approximation Algorithm for Arbitrary Graphs - A Simulation -- 6 Experimental Results -- 6.1 Experimental Results: Peer Pressure Effects on Privacy Preferences -- 6.2 Experimental Results: Iterative Approximation of Privacy Preferences -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Definitions -- 3 Imperfect Information HP Allocation Game -- 3.1 Nature Actions -- 3.2 Defender's Actions -- 3.3 Attacker's Actions -- 3.4 Players' Utilities -- 3.5 Solution Concepts -- 4 Game Approximations -- 4.1 Perfect Information Game Approximation -- 4.2 Zero-Sum Game Approximation -- 4.3 Commitment to Correlated Equilibrium -- 5 Algorithms -- 5.1 Single Oracle -- 5.2 Attacker's Optimal Attack Policy -- 5.3 Linear Program for Upper Bounds -- 6 Experiments -- 6.1 Networks and Attack Graphs -- 6.2 Analytical Approach for CURB for Unstructured Network -- 6.3 Scalability -- 6.4 Solution Quality -- 6.5 Quality of ZS Approximations -- 6.6 Sensitivity Analysis -- 6.7 Case Study -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- When the Winning Move is Not to Play: Games of Deterrence in Cyber Security -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Concepts of Deterrence -- 2.2 Information Asymmetries in Security -- 2.3 Adversary Scenarios -- 3 Deterrence as an Information Asymmetry. 327 $a3.1 Deterrence as Screening: An Example of Tactical Deterrence -- 3.2 Deterrence as Signalling: An Example of Operational Deterrence -- 3.3 Discussion -- 4 Related Work -- 5 Conclusions -- References -- Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Rational Proofs -- 3 Profit vs. Reward -- 4 Sequential Composition -- 4.1 Motivating Example -- 4.2 Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs -- 4.3 Sequential Rational Proofs in the PCP Model -- 4.4 Sequential Composition and the Unique Inner State Assumption -- 5 Our Protocol -- 5.1 Efficiency -- 5.2 Proofs of (Stand-Alone) Rationality -- 5.3 Proof of Sequential Composability -- 6 Results for FFT Circuits -- 6.1 FFT Circuit for Computing a Single Coefficient -- 6.2 Mixed Strategies for Verification -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Flip the Cloud: Cyber-Physical Signaling Games in the Presence of Advanced Persistent Threats -- 1 Introduction -- 2 System Model -- 2.1 Cloud-Device Signaling Game -- 2.2 FlipIt Game for Cloud Control -- 3 Solution Concept -- 3.1 Signaling Game Equilibrium -- 3.2 FlipIt Game Equilibrium -- 3.3 Gestalt Equilibrium of GCC -- 4 Analysis -- 4.1 Signaling Game Analysis -- 4.2 FlipIt Analysis -- 4.3 GCC Analysis -- 5 Cloud Control Application -- 5.1 Dynamic Model for Cloud Controlled Unmanned Vehicles -- 5.2 Control of Unmanned Vehicle -- 5.3 Filter for High Risk Cloud Commands -- 6 Conclusion and Future Work -- A Derivation of Signaling Game Equilibria -- A.1 Separating Equilibria -- A.2 Pooling Equilibria -- References -- Short Papers -- Genetic Approximations for the Failure-Free Security Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Definitions -- 3 Genetic Approximations for the Failure-Free Satisfiability Games -- 3.1 Genetic Algorithm (GA) -- 4 Adaptive Genetic Algorithm (AGA) -- 5 Conclusions -- References. 327 $aTo Trust or Not: A Security Signaling Game Between Service Provider and Client. 330 $aThis book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015, held in London, UK, in November 2015. The 16 revised full papers presented together with 5 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. Game and decision theory has emerged as a valuable systematic framework with powerful analytical tools in dealing with the intricacies involved in making sound and sensible security decisions. For instance, game theory provides methodical approaches to account for interdependencies of security decisions, the role of hidden and asymmetric information, the perception of risks and costs in human behaviour, the incentives/limitations of the attackers, and much more. Combined with our classical approach to computer and network security, and drawing from various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security". 410 0$aSecurity and Cryptology ;$v9406 606 $aApplication software 606 $aComputer communication systems 606 $aComputer security 606 $aAlgorithms 606 $aManagement information systems 606 $aComputer science 606 $aGame theory 606 $aInformation Systems Applications (incl. Internet)$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I18040 606 $aComputer Communication Networks$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I13022 606 $aSystems and Data Security$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I28060 606 $aAlgorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I16021 606 $aManagement of Computing and Information Systems$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I24067 606 $aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/M13011 615 0$aApplication software. 615 0$aComputer communication systems. 615 0$aComputer security. 615 0$aAlgorithms. 615 0$aManagement information systems. 615 0$aComputer science. 615 0$aGame theory. 615 14$aInformation Systems Applications (incl. Internet). 615 24$aComputer Communication Networks. 615 24$aSystems and Data Security. 615 24$aAlgorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity. 615 24$aManagement of Computing and Information Systems. 615 24$aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. 676 $a005.8 702 $aKhouzani$b Arman (MHR)$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aPanaousis$b Emmanouil$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aTheodorakopoulos$b George$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996466572103316 996 $aDecision and game theory for security$92161899 997 $aUNISA