LEADER 05400nam 22008415 450 001 996465446903316 005 20211005214708.0 010 $a3-030-47994-3 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-47994-7 035 $a(CKB)4100000011363758 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-47994-7 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6420171 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6420171 035 $a(OCoLC)1182515218 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6978213 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6978213 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/30895 035 $a(PPN)260302767 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000011363758 100 $a20200731d2020 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aLeveraging Data Science for Global Health$b[electronic resource] /$fedited by Leo Anthony Celi, Maimuna S. Majumder, Patricia Ordóñez, Juan Sebastian Osorio, Kenneth E. Paik, Melek Somai 205 $a1st ed. 2020. 210 $cSpringer Nature$d2020 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2020. 215 $a1 online resource (XII, 475 p. 196 illus., 175 illus. in color.) 311 $a3-030-47993-5 327 $aPart 1: Big Data and Global Health Landscape -- Chapter 1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Big Data for Global Health Surveillance -- Chapter 2. Opportunities for Health Big Data in Africa -- Chapter 3. HealthMap and Digital Disease Surveillance -- Chapter 4. Mobility Data and Genomics for Disease Surveillance -- Part 2: Case Studies -- Chapter 5. Kumbh Mela Disease Surveillance -- Chapter 6. Using Google Mobility Data for Disaster Monitoring in Puerto Rico -- Chapter 7. StreetRx and the Opioid Epidemic -- Chapter 8. Twitter Data for Zika Virus Surveillance in Venezuela -- Chapter 9. Hepatitis E Outbreak in Namibia and Google Trends -- Chapter 10. Patient-Controlled Health Records for Non-Communicable Diseases in Humanitarian Settings -- Chapter 11. Addressing Sexual and Reproductive Health among Youth Migrants -- Chapter 12. Tanzanian cholera: epidemic or endemic? -- Chapter 13. Google Satellite Images to Predict Yellow Fever Incidence in Brazil -- Chapter 14. Feature Selection and Prediction of Treatment Failure in Tuberculosis -- Chapter 15. Tuberculosis, Refugees, and the Politics of Journalistic Objectivity: A qualitative review using HealthMap data -- Chapter 16. Designing Tools to Support the Cutaneous Leishmaniasis Trial in Colombia. 330 $aThis open access book explores ways to leverage information technology and machine learning to combat disease and promote health, especially in resource-constrained settings. It focuses on digital disease surveillance through the application of machine learning to non-traditional data sources. Developing countries are uniquely prone to large-scale emerging infectious disease outbreaks due to disruption of ecosystems, civil unrest, and poor healthcare infrastructure ? and without comprehensive surveillance, delays in outbreak identification, resource deployment, and case management can be catastrophic. In combination with context-informed analytics, students will learn how non-traditional digital disease data sources ? including news media, social media, Google Trends, and Google Street View ? can fill critical knowledge gaps and help inform on-the-ground decision-making when formal surveillance systems are insufficient. 606 $aHealth informatics 606 $aHealth economics 606 $aHealth Informatics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/H28009 606 $aHealth Informatics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I23060 606 $aHealth Economics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W35000 610 $aHealth Informatics 610 $aHealth Economics 610 $aOpen Access 610 $aBig Data 610 $aMachine Learning 610 $aArtificial Intelligence 610 $aDigital Disease Surveillance 610 $aHealth Mapping 610 $aHealth Records for Non-Communicable Diseases 610 $aHealthMap 610 $aTools for Clinical Trials 610 $aMedical equipment & techniques 610 $aInformation technology: general issues 610 $aHealth & safety aspects of IT 610 $aHealth economics 615 0$aHealth informatics. 615 0$aHealth economics. 615 14$aHealth Informatics. 615 24$aHealth Informatics. 615 24$aHealth Economics. 676 $a502.85 700 $aCeli$b Leo Anthony$4edt$01354887 702 $aCeli$b Leo Anthony$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aMajumder$b Maimuna S$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aOrdóñez$b Patricia$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aOsorio$b Juan Sebastian$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aPaik$b Kenneth E$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 702 $aSomai$b Melek$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996465446903316 996 $aLeveraging Data Science for Global Health$93358590 997 $aUNISA LEADER 05399nam 2201189Ia 450 001 9910790181003321 005 20230801221958.0 010 $a1-280-49411-5 010 $a9786613589347 010 $a1-4008-4251-4 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400842513 035 $a(CKB)2670000000161942 035 $a(EBL)879140 035 $a(OCoLC)845243797 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000623605 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11374086 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000623605 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10656678 035 $a(PQKB)10822546 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC879140 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000406930 035 $a(OCoLC)782925047 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse37106 035 $a(DE-B1597)447964 035 $a(OCoLC)979742306 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400842513 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL879140 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10546810 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL358934 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000161942 100 $a20110930d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhy adjudicate?$b[electronic resource] $eenforcing trade rules in the WTO /$fChristina L. Davis 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, NJ $cPrinceton University Press$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (345 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-15275-6 311 $a0-691-15276-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tFigures -- $tTables -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tAbbreviations -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. Domestic Constraints And Active Enforcement -- $t3. The Democratic Propensity For Adjudication -- $t4. The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy -- $t5. The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy -- $t6. Conflict Management: Evaluating The Effectiveness Of Adjudication -- $t7. Level Playing Field? Adjudication By Developing Countries -- $t8. Conclusion -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aThe World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries. 606 $aForeign trade regulation 606 $aAdministrative procedure 610 $aChina. 610 $aJapan. 610 $aJapanese trade policy. 610 $aPeru. 610 $aU.S. Congress. 610 $aU.S. trade policy. 610 $aUnited States. 610 $aVietnam. 610 $aWTO. 610 $aWorld Trade Organization. 610 $aaccountability. 610 $aadjudication. 610 $abargaining. 610 $abureaucracy. 610 $aconflict. 610 $acooperation. 610 $acourts. 610 $adelegation of authority. 610 $ademocracy. 610 $ademocratic politics. 610 $adeveloping countries. 610 $adispute settlement. 610 $adomestic constraints. 610 $adomestic politics. 610 $aexports. 610 $aforeign economic policy. 610 $afree trade. 610 $ageopolitics. 610 $aindustry lobbying. 610 $ainternational politics. 610 $ainternational relations. 610 $ainternational trade law. 610 $ainternational trade. 610 $alabeling. 610 $alegalization. 610 $aliberalization. 610 $apoliticization. 610 $atrade barriers. 610 $atrade disputes. 610 $atrade law enforcement. 610 $atrade policy. 610 $atrade. 615 0$aForeign trade regulation. 615 0$aAdministrative procedure. 676 $a382/.92 686 $aMK 8650$qBVB$2rvk 700 $aDavis$b Christina L.$f1971-$01462562 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910790181003321 996 $aWhy adjudicate$93671583 997 $aUNINA