LEADER 05059nam 2200637 a 450 001 996320210503316 005 20240516152954.0 010 $a0-8330-5853-3 035 $a(CKB)2670000000180318 035 $a(EBL)903016 035 $a(OCoLC)792688504 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000636274 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11367417 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000636274 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10659986 035 $a(PQKB)11789232 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL903016 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10556494 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC903016 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000180318 100 $a20111201d2011 ua 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aHard fighting $eIsrael in Lebanon and Gaza /$fDavid E. Johnson 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSanta Monica, CA$cRAND$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (xxxv, 227 pages) 300 $a"Prepared for the United States Army and the United States Air Force." 311 1 $a0-8330-5850-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; S.1. Levels of Adversaries and Their Associated Military Capabilities, with Examples; S.1. Air and Ground Power Across the Levels of Adversary Capabilities; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Purpose; Methodology; Monograph Organization; CHAPTER TWO: The Second Lebanon War; 2.1. Map of Southern Lebanon; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2006; What's in It for Us? The Problems with "Lessons Learned" from Lebanon; The IDF in Transition 327 $aConfronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design; The IDF and Standoff Fires; Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada; The Israeli Elite's Misperceptions About the Security Environment; IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah; Terrain; Hezbollah's Preparation of the Battlefield; Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary; 2.1. Hezbollah Rockets, 2006; 2.2. A Concealed Hezbollah Rocket System; 2.2. Other Hezbollah Weapons 327 $aHow the Second Lebanon War Unfolded Israel's Strategy in Lebanon; The Air War; 2.3. Map of Lebanese Targets Attacked by Israel; The Initial Ground War; Losing Support for the War; One Final Offensive; 2.4. Ground Scheme of Maneuver: Operation Changing Direction; 2.5. Final IDF Positions and Hezbollah Rocket-Launching Sites; The End of the War; Shortfalls Identified in the Second Lebanon War; Standoff Fires Are Critical, but Not Sufficient, to Achieving Objectives; The Short-Range Rocket Challenge; 2.6. The Changing Nature of Israeli Targets 327 $aCivil-Military Issues, Unclear Objectives, and a Lack of Jointness Hezbollah Presented the IDF with a New Type of Adversary; CHAPTER THREE: Operation Cast Lead; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2008; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hamas; Terrain; Hamas' Preparation of the Battlefield; 3.1. The Gaza Strip; Hamas: A Hybrid Opponent, but Not Hezbollah; The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades; Internal Security Forces; Hamas' Weapons; 3.1. Hamas Rockets; How Operation Cast Lead Unfolded; The Air Campaign; The Ground Campaign 327 $a3.2. The IDF Ground Campaign in Operation Cast Lead Hamas' Military Strategy During Operation Cast Lead; The End of Operation Cast Lead; Insights from Operation Cast Lead; Unresolved Problems in Determining Strategic "Ends"; Significant Improvement in the Military "Means"; Military Lessons Learned from Operation Cast Lead; Military Operations "Amongst the People"; Joint Fire and Maneuver Against Hybrid Opponents; Air-Ground Integration; 3.3. IDF Air Control Organizations; Operation Cast Lead Was Not a Robust Hybrid Case 327 $aCHAPTER FOUR: The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force 330 $aLike Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the lessons it learned during that conflict, the reforms it undertook to address its deficiencies, and how it fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later. 606 $aAsymmetric warfare$vCase studies 606 $aLebanon War, 2006 606 $aGaza War, 2008-2009 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy 615 0$aAsymmetric warfare 615 0$aLebanon War, 2006. 615 0$aGaza War, 2008-2009. 676 $a956.9204/524095694 700 $aJohnson$b David E$g(David Eugene),$f1950-2022.$01324812 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996320210503316 996 $aHard fighting$94157112 997 $aUNISA