LEADER 03507nam 22006372 450 001 996248301303316 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-107-17229-2 010 $a1-280-85048-5 010 $a0-511-27925-6 010 $a0-511-61881-6 010 $a0-511-27865-9 010 $a0-511-27748-2 010 $a0-511-32166-X 010 $a0-511-27807-1 035 $a(CKB)1000000000351921 035 $a(EBL)293387 035 $a(OCoLC)437178944 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000307788 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11225271 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000307788 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10243947 035 $a(PQKB)11477762 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511618819 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC293387 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000351921 100 $a20090915d2007|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aRebuilding Leviathan $eparty competition and state exploitation in post-communist democracies /$fAnna Grzymala-Busse$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2007. 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 274 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-69615-1 311 $a0-521-87396-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 247-268) and index. 327 $aCompeting for the state -- Developing the formal institutions of the state -- The expansion of state administration : exploitation or patronage? -- Privatizing the state : party financing strategies -- Conclusion -- Appendix A. Party organizations in post-communist democracies -- Appendix B. Measuring state administration employment -- Appendix C. Anchoring vignettes. 330 $aWhy do some governing parties limit their opportunistic behaviour and constrain the extraction of private gains from the state? This analysis of post-communist state reconstruction provides surprising answers to this fundamental question of party politics. Across the post-communist democracies, governing parties have opportunistically reconstructed the state - simultaneously exploiting it by extracting state resources and building new institutions that further such extraction. They enfeebled or delayed formal state institutions of monitoring and oversight, established new discretionary structures of state administration, and extracted enormous informal profits from the privatization of the communist economy. By examining how post-communist political parties rebuilt the state in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Grzymala-Busse explains how even opportunistic political parties will limit their corrupt behaviour and abuse of state resources when faced with strong political competition. 410 0$aCambridge studies in comparative politics. 606 $aPolitical parties$zEurope, Eastern 606 $aPost-communism$zEurope, Eastern 607 $aEurope, Eastern$xPolitics and government$y1989- 615 0$aPolitical parties 615 0$aPost-communism 676 $a324.20947 700 $aGrzyma?a-Busse$b Anna Maria$f1970-$0849492 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996248301303316 996 $aRebuilding Leviathan$92414557 997 $aUNISA