LEADER 03819nam 2200637 450 001 996234846603316 005 20230807193825.0 010 $a1-5015-0198-4 010 $a1-5015-0200-X 024 7 $a10.1515/9781501501982 035 $a(CKB)3710000000496971 035 $a(EBL)4179712 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001516463 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12649752 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001516463 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11494200 035 $a(PQKB)11006186 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4179712 035 $a(DE-B1597)445849 035 $a(OCoLC)932011071 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501501982 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4179712 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11123832 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL876186 035 $a(OCoLC)932333920 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000496971 100 $a20151222h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMinimal verificationism $eon the limits of knowledge /$fGordian Haas 210 1$aBoston, [Massachusetts] ;$aBerlin, [Germany] :$cDe Gruyter,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (224 p.) 225 1 $aEpistemische Studien,$x2198-1884 ;$vBand 31 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-5015-1057-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $tFront matter --$tAcknowledgements --$tContents --$tFigures and Tables --$tIntroduction: Does This Make Nonsense to You? --$t1 Some Historic Formulations and Their Problems --$t2 More Problems Lie Ahead --$t3 Toward a Solution to the Problems --$t4 Minimal Verificationism --$t5 Fallibilist Theories of Justification --$t6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM --$t7 Combining Theories of Justification and Belief Revision: Judas --$t8 Lewis? Semantics for Counterfactuals --$t9 Towards a Verifiability-Friendly Semantics for Counterfactuals --$t10 (Non) Concluding Remarks --$tReferences --$tName Index --$tSubject Index 330 $aVerificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. According to this principle, a sentence is insignificant in a certain sense if its truth value cannot be determined. Although logical empiricists strove for decades to develop an adequate principle of verification, they failed to resolve its problems. This led to a general abandonment of the verificationist project in the early 1960's. In the last 50 years, this view has received tremendously bad press. Today it is mostly regarded as an outdated historical concept. Theories that have evolved since the abandonment of verificationism can, however, help overcome some of its key problems. More specifically, an adequate criterion of significance can be derived from a combination of modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for counterfactuals. In view of these potential improvements, the abandonment of verificationism appears premature. Half a century following its decline, it might be about time to revisit this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism. This approach could be referred to as minimal verificationism, as it involves a weakening of traditional verificationist principles in various respects while maintaining their core idea. 410 0$aDeutsche Hochschulschriften.$pEpistemische Studien ;$vBand 31. 606 $aVerification (Empiricism) 606 $aLogical positivism 615 0$aVerification (Empiricism) 615 0$aLogical positivism. 676 $a121.2 700 $aHaas$b Gordian$01017822 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996234846603316 996 $aMinimal verificationism$92390022 997 $aUNISA