LEADER 06387nam 2200541Ia 450 001 996197694003316 005 20230721031307.0 010 $a1-281-06933-7 010 $a9786611069339 010 $a0-470-69216-2 010 $a0-470-76609-3 035 $a(CKB)1000000000415531 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH3925077 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000174935 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11922846 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000174935 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10188333 035 $a(PQKB)10721442 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC320085 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000415531 100 $a20070126d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aHuman nature$b[electronic resource] $ethe categorial framework /$fP.M.S. Hacker 210 $aOxford $cBlackwell$d2007 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 326 p.) 300 $aOriginally published: Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. 311 $a1-4051-4728-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPreface. Chapter 1 The Project. 1. Human nature. 2. Philosophical anthropology. 3. Grammatical investigation. 4. Philosophical investigation. 5. Philosophy and 'mere words'. 6. A challenge to the autonomy of the philosophical enterprise: Quine. 7. The Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in philosophical anthropology. Chapter 2 Substance. 1. Substances: things. 2. Substances: stuffs. 3. Substance-referring expressions. 4. Conceptual connections between things and stuffs. 5. Substances and their substantial parts. 6. Substances conceived as natural kinds. 7. Substances conceived as a common logico-linguistic category. 8. A historical digression: misconceptions of the category of substance. Chapter 3 Causation. 1. Causation: Humean, neo-Humean and anti-Humean. 2. On causal necessity. 3. Event causation is not a prototype. 4. The inadequacy of Hume's analysis: observability, spatio-temporal relations and regularity. 5. The flaw in the early modern debate. 6. Agent causation as prototype. 7. Agent causation is only a prototype. 8. Event causation and other centres of variation. 9. Overview. Chapter 4 Powers. 1. Possibility. 2. Powers of the inanimate. 3. Active and passive powers of the inanimate. 4. Power and its actualization. 5. Power and its vehicle. 6. First- and second-order powers; loss of power. 7. Human powers: basic distinctions. 8. Human powers: further distinctions. 9. Dispositions. Chapter 5 Agency. 1. Inanimate agents. 2. Inanimate needs. 3. Animate agents: needs and wants. 4. Volitional agency: preliminaries. 5. Doings, acts and actions. 6. Human agency and action. 7. A historical overview. 8. Human action as agential causation of movement. Chapter 6 Teleology and Teleological Explanation. 1. Teleology and purpose. 2. What things have a purpose? 3. Purpose and axiology. 4. The beneficial. 5. A historical digression: teleology and causality. Chapter 7 Reasons and Explanation of Human Action. 1. Rationality and reasonableness. 2. Reason, reasoning and reasons. 3. Explaining human behaviour. 4. Explanation in terms of agential reasons. 5. Causal mythologies. Chapter 8 The Mind. 1. Homo loquens . 2. The Cartesian mind. 3. The nature of the mind. Chapter 9 The Self and the Body. 1. The emergence of the philosophers' self. 2. The illusion of the philosophers' self. 3. The body. 4. The relationship between human beings and their bodies. Chapter 10 The Person. 1. The emergence of the concept. 2. An unholy trinity: Descartes, Locke and Hume. 3. Changing bodies and switching brains: puzzle cases and red herrings. 4. The concept of a person. Index. 330 $aWritten by one of the world's leading philosophers, this text uses broad categories, such as substance, causation, agency, and power, to examine how we think about ourselves and our nature. 330 $bThis major study examines the most fundamental categories in terms of which we conceive of ourselves, critically surveying the concepts of substance, causation, agency, teleology, rationality, mind, body and person, and elaborating the conceptual fields in which they are embedded. The culmination of 40 years of thought on the philosophy of mind and the nature of the mankind Written by one of the world's leading philosophers, the co-author of the monumental 4 volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell Publishing, 1980-2004) Uses broad categories, such as substance, causation, agency and power to examine how we think about ourselves and our nature Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of human nature are sketched and contrasted Individual chapters clarify and provide an historical overview of a specific concept, then link the concept to ideas contained in other chapters What distinguishes humanity from the rest of animate nature? What grounds the distinctive powers of human beings? What are the forms of explanation proper to the understanding of the exercise of these powers in action? Human beings have both a mind and a body - but what is a mind? What is it to have a body? How is a person's mind related to their body? And what is a person? This major new study, by one of the most penetrating and persistent critics of philosophical and scientific orthodoxy, returns to Aristotle in order to examine the salient categories in terms of which we think about ourselves and our nature. An overview of the concepts of substance, causation, power and agency provides the background for an investigation into teleology, rationality and explanations of behaviour in terms of reasons. This is the stage-set for the analysis of the concepts of mind, self, body and person. This essay in philosophical anthropology ranges widely over themes in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and of action, and philosophy of biology, blending powerful philosophical analysis with a masterful grasp of the history of philosophical reflection on the topics in question. 606 $aPhilosophical anthropology 606 $aAnthropology 615 0$aPhilosophical anthropology. 615 0$aAnthropology. 676 $a128 700 $aHacker$b P. M. S$g(Peter Michael Stephan)$0896786 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996197694003316 996 $aHuman nature$92132544 997 $aUNISA