LEADER 01364nam2-2200421---450- 001 990000836290203316 005 20151023104740.0 035 $a0083629 035 $aUSA010083629 035 $a(ALEPH)000083629USA01 035 $a0083629 100 $a20041215d1984----km-y0itay0103----ba 101 0 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $a||||||||001yy 200 1 $a<<2.>> : <> personale universitario$eaggiornamento al 1. marzo 1984$fa cura di Domenico Fazio ... [et al.] 210 $aMilano$cGiuffrè$d1984 215 $aXXII, 1430 p.$d21 cm 410 0$12001 454 1$12001 461 1$1001000227197$12001$a<>ordinamento universitario italiano 606 0 $aUniversità$xLegislazione$yItalia$2BNCF 676 $a344.45074 702 1$aFAZIO,$bDomenico 801 0$aIT$bsalbc$gISBD 912 $a990000836290203316 951 $aXXIV.3.A 142/1 (IG IV 705/I)$b22630 E.C.$cXXIV.3.A 142/1 (IG IV 705/)$d00242020 959 $aBK 969 $aGIU 979 $aPATTY$b90$c20020103$lUSA01$h1430 979 $c20020403$lUSA01$h1729 979 $aPATRY$b90$c20040406$lUSA01$h1658 979 $aCOPAT1$b90$c20051114$lUSA01$h1348 979 $aPATRY$b90$c20151020$lUSA01$h1001 979 $aPATRY$b90$c20151023$lUSA01$h1045 979 $aPATRY$b90$c20151023$lUSA01$h1047 996 $aPersonale universitario$993121 997 $aUNISA LEADER 03267nam 22004815 450 001 9910299652403321 005 20240321223904.0 010 $a9783319709086 010 $a3319709089 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-70908-6 035 $a(CKB)4100000002892109 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5358069 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-70908-6 035 $a(Perlego)3491114 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000002892109 100 $a20180321d2018 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe 1772-73 British Credit Crisis /$fby Paul Kosmetatos 205 $a1st ed. 2018. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (351 pages) 225 1 $aPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance,$x2662-5172 311 0 $a9783319709079 311 0 $a3319709070 327 $a1. 'A Year of Confusion, Dismay, and Distress': The 1772-73 Financial Crisis and Its Potential Significance -- 2. A Minsky Bubble? Economic Growth and the Financial Sector in 1763-72 -- 3.'Roguery', 'Stupidity', and Permissive Regulation: Asset Speculation and Speculative Projects in 1763-72 -- 4. Propagation and Containment: Financial Contagion and the Lender of Last Resort in 1772-73 -- 5. Impact and Resolution -- 6. Conclusion. . 330 $aNowadays remembered mostly through Adam Smith's references to the short-lived Ayr Bank in the Wealth of Nations, the 1772-3 financial crisis was an important historical episode in its own right, taking place during a pivotal period in the development of financial capitalism and coinciding with the start of the traditional industrialisation narrative. It was also one of the earliest purely financial crises occurring in peacetime, and its progress showed an impressive geographical reach, involving England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the North American colonies. This book uses a variety of previously unpublished archival sources to question the bubble narrative usually associated with this crisis, and to identify the mechanisms of financial contagion that allowed the failure of a small private bank in London to cause rapid and severe distress throughout the 18th century financial system. It re-examines the short and turbulent career of the Ayr Bank, and concludes that its failure was the result of cavalier liability management akin to that of Northern Rock in 2007, rather than the poor asset quality alleged in existing literature. It furthermore argues that the Bank of England's prompt efforts to contain the crisis are evidence of a Lender of Last Resort in action, some thirty years before the classical formulation of the concept by Henry Thornton. 410 0$aPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance,$x2662-5172 606 $aFinance 606 $aHistory 606 $aFinancial History 615 0$aFinance. 615 0$aHistory. 615 14$aFinancial History. 676 $a330.941 700 $aKosmetatos$b Paul$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01060812 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910299652403321 996 $aThe 1772-73 British Credit Crisis$94327603 997 $aUNINA