LEADER 01563nam0 22003011i 450 001 UON00014467 005 20231205101947.894 100 $a20020107g13721993 |0itac50 ba 101 $aper 102 $aIR 105 $a|||| 1|||| 200 1 $aKordestan$eelal-e tadavom-e bohran-e an pas az enqelab-e eslami (1358-1370)$fHamid Reza Jala'ipur 210 $aTehran$cVezarat-e omur-e xareje$d1372 H. [1993]. 219 p. ; 21 cm 215 $aAltro front.: Kurdistan: Causes for the Continuation of its Crisis Following theIslamic Revolution (1358-1370) / Hamid Reza Jalaiepoor 510 1$3UON00374579$aKurdistan: Causes for the Continuation of its Crisis Following theIslamic Revolution (1358-1370) / Hamid Reza Jalaiepoor 606 $aCURDISTAN$xStoria$xPeriodo contemporaneo$3UONC003634$2FI 606 $aIRAN$xSTORIA$xRIVOLUZIONE ISLAMICA$xCURDISTAN$3UONC005224$2FI 620 $aIR$dTihra?n$3UONL005570 686 $aIRA IV DB$cIRAN - STORIA - STORIA REGIONALE E LOCALE - PERIODO MODERNO (DAL 1501)$2A 700 1$aJALA'IPUR$bHamid Reza$3UONV010814$0640403 712 $aVezarat-e omur-e xareje$3UONV247949$4650 801 $aIT$bSOL$c20240220$gRICA 899 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$2UONSI 912 $aUON00014467 950 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$dSI IRA IV DB 050 N $eSI SA 77926 5 050 N 966 $aCURDISTAN - Storia$yIRAN - STORIA - RIVOLUZIONE ISLAMICA - CURDISTAN$3UONC000294 996 $aKordestan$91180510 997 $aUNIOR LEADER 02996nam 2200553 450 001 9910810774803321 005 20230803213330.0 010 $a0-87609-589-9 010 $a0-87609-590-2 035 $a(CKB)3710000000441136 035 $a(EBL)3425956 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001577799 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16253025 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001577799 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14860194 035 $a(PQKB)10957341 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3425956 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000441136 100 $a20150725h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLimiting armed drone proliferation /$fMicah Zenko and Sarah Kreps 210 1$aNew York, New York :$cCouncil on Foreign Relations,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (53 p.) 225 1 $aCouncil Special Report ;$vNumber 69 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-87609-588-0 327 $aContents; Foreword; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Drone Proliferation Trends; How Drones Are Different and Can Destabilize; Proliferation Constraints and Incentives; Debates About Armed Drone Exports; Debates About Armed Drone Uses; Conclusions and Recommendations; Endnotes; About the Authors; Advisory Committee for Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation; Center for Preventive Action Advisory Committee; Mission Statement of the Center for Preventive Action; Council Special Reports 330 $a"Though the United States remains the lead actor in terms of possessing and using armed drones, the rest of the world is quickly catching up. Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example, have begun to develop increasingly sophisticated indigenous drone capabilities. Other countries, including Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have publicized their intent to purchase them. The direct consequences of armed drone proliferation on U.S. national security are several years out, but the policymaking decisions that will shape those consequences confront the Obama administration today. How the United States uses armed drones and for what purposes will contribute to the norms that will influence how states use them in the future."--Introduction, page 3. 410 0$aCSR (New York, N.Y.) ;$vNumber 69. 606 $aUninhabited combat aerial vehicles$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 606 $aDrone aircraft$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 615 0$aUninhabited combat aerial vehicles$xGovernment policy 615 0$aDrone aircraft$xGovernment policy 676 $a358.4183 700 $aZenko$b Micah$01620572 702 $aKreps$b Sarah E. 712 02$aCouncil on Foreign Relations, 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810774803321 996 $aLimiting armed drone proliferation$93995510 997 $aUNINA