LEADER 00918nam0 22002411i 450 001 UON00002008 005 20231205101853.363 100 $a20020107d1922 |0itac50 ba 101 $ager 102 $aDD 105 $a|||| 1|||| 200 1 $aˆDie ‰Philosophie der Upanishad's$fPaul Deussen 210 $aLeipzig$cF.A.Brockhaus$d1922 215 $aXIV, 401 p.$d20 cm 606 $aFILOSOFIA$xINDIA$xUPANISHAD$3UONC003696$2FI 686 $aSI VII A$cSubcontinente indiano - Religione e filosofia - Hinduismo$2A 700 1$aDEUSSEN$bPaul$3UONV001563$00 801 $aIT$bSOL$c20250711$gRICA 899 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$2UONSI 912 $aUON00002008 950 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$dSI SI VII A 402 N $eSI SA 69321 5 402 N 996 $aPhilosophie der Upanishad's$91174309 997 $aUNIOR LEADER 01832nam 2200421z- 450 001 9910346959903321 005 20210212 010 $a1-000-07208-8 035 $a(CKB)4920000000100923 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/59940 035 $a(oapen)doab59940 035 $a(EXLCZ)994920000000100923 100 $a20202102d2017 |y 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurmn|---annan 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aStability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory 210 $cKIT Scientific Publishing$d2017 215 $a1 online resource (XXII, 221 p. p.) 311 08$a3-7315-0700-5 330 $aInternational cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable. 610 $aclimate change 610 $acooperation 610 $agame theory 610 $ainternational economic effects 610 $aInternationale o?konomische Effekte 610 $aKlimawandel 610 $aKooperation 610 $aSpieltheorie 610 $aStabilita?t 610 $astability 700 $aKersting$b Jan$4auth$01281088 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910346959903321 996 $aStability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory$93018034 997 $aUNINA