LEADER 03765nam 22006375 450 001 9911034949803321 005 20251019130408.0 010 $a3-031-98323-8 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-031-98323-8 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC32364429 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL32364429 035 $a(CKB)41667610600041 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-031-98323-8 035 $a(EXLCZ)9941667610600041 100 $a20251019d2025 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aCivilian Oversight of Military Operations in Afghanistan $eThe Case of SIGAR /$fby Patrick J. Sullivan 205 $a1st ed. 2025. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer Nature Switzerland :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2025. 215 $a1 online resource (332 pages) 225 1 $aPalgrave Studies in Global Security,$x3005-1002 311 08$a3-031-98322-X 327 $aChapter 1: A Tale of Two Wars -- Chapter 2: SIGAR and the Afghanistan IG Enterprise in Context -- Chapter 3: Framework to Assess Afghanistan Oversight -- Chapter 4: SIGAR?s Failure to Audit -- Chapter 5: SIGAR?s Auditing of Failure -- Chapter 6: Afghanistan Oversight in the Congressional Record and Executive Reports -- Chapter 7: hat the Failure of the Afghanistan Oversight Regime Says About the Future. 330 $aThis book assesses the oversight regime in Afghanistan to identify and characterize the oversight failures, and then links them to specific negative strategic outcomes. Although there are high-quality analyses available about what went wrong in Afghanistan and why, few of them are grounded in scholarly research that uses empirical methods. This book fills that epistemological gap as well as provides a unique contribution to the body of literature, which does not contain any comprehensive studies of Afghanistan oversight. This type of study is important because certain characterizations of an oversight failure?e.g., Congress knowing that things were going badly in Afghanistan but choosing not to do anything about it?point to several pathologies about political control of the military and the incentive structures contained therein. Understanding and proactively managing these pathologies will be critical to improving strategic outcomes in future complex military interventions of the Afghanistan type. Patrick J. Sullivan, PhD, is a United States Army Colonel currently serving as an Academy Professor and Director of the Modern War Institute at West Point. He is veteran of eight combined tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, and has commanded engineer units at company-level through brigade. . 410 0$aPalgrave Studies in Global Security,$x3005-1002 606 $aSecurity, International 606 $aPolitical science 606 $aMilitary history 606 $aPolitics and war 606 $aInternational Security Studies 606 $aPolitics and International Studies 606 $aMilitary History 606 $aMilitary and Defence Studies 606 $aGovernance and Government 615 0$aSecurity, International. 615 0$aPolitical science. 615 0$aMilitary history. 615 0$aPolitics and war. 615 14$aInternational Security Studies. 615 24$aPolitics and International Studies. 615 24$aMilitary History. 615 24$aMilitary and Defence Studies. 615 24$aGovernance and Government. 676 $a355.0330581 700 $aSullivan$b Patrick J$0145191 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9911034949803321 996 $aCivilian Oversight of Military Operations in Afghanistan$94449235 997 $aUNINA