LEADER 01313nam a2200289 i 4500 001 991003064559707536 005 20021031120558.0 008 020919s1992 it ||| | ita 020 $a8837105436$cLire 40.500 035 $ab11749416-39ule_inst 035 $aLE02615067$9ExL 040 $aDip.to Ingegneria dell'Innovazione$bita 082 0 $a620.1126 100 1 $aCarpinteri, Alberto$030793 245 10$aMeccanica dei materiali e della frattura /$ca cura di Alberto Carpinteri 260 $aBologna :$bPitagora,$cc 1992 300 $aviii, 267 p. :$bill. ;$c27 cm 490 0 $aIngegneria strutturale 650 4$aMeccanica della frattura 907 $a.b11749416$b27-04-17$c05-11-02 912 $a991003064559707536 945 $aLE026 620.1126 D CAR 01.01 C.1 1992$cC.1$g1$i2026000013152$lle026$op$pE0.00$q-$rn$s- $t1$u6$v0$w6$x0$y.i11989348$z05-11-02 945 $aLE026 620.1126 D CAR 01.01 C.2 1992$cC.2$g1$i2026000015781$lle026$nFondo CDS$op$pE20.02$q-$rl$s- $t0$u22$v7$w22$x0$y.i14403353$z20-03-07 945 $aLE026 620.1126 D CAR 01.01 C.3 1992$cC.3$g1$i2026000015774$lle026$nFondo CDS$o-$pE20.02$q-$rl$s- $t0$u22$v3$w22$x0$y.i14403390$z20-03-07 996 $aMeccanica dei materiali e della frattura$9905492 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale026$b01-01-02$cm$da $e-$fita$git $h0$i1 LEADER 02853nam 22004813 450 001 9911002590603321 005 20250514080314.0 010 $a0-472-90501-5 035 $a(CKB)38429097600041 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC32077176 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL32077176 035 $a(EXLCZ)9938429097600041 100 $a20250514d2025 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aStrategic Responsiveness $eHow Congress Confronts Presidential Power 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aAnn Arbor :$cUniversity of Michigan Press,$d2025. 210 4$dİ2025. 215 $a1 online resource (215 pages) 225 1 $aLegislative Politics and Policy Making Series 311 08$a0-472-07741-4 311 08$a0-472-05741-3 330 $aSince the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach-- situated within legal and historical contexts--to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress can often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins keep occurring, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order. 410 0$aLegislative Politics and Policy Making Series 606 $aExecutive-legislative relations$zUnited States 606 $aSeparation of powers$zUnited States 615 0$aExecutive-legislative relations 615 0$aSeparation of powers 676 $a328.3/456 700 $aAinsworth$b Scott H$01819599 701 $aHarward$b Brian M$01819600 701 $aMoffett$b Kenneth W$01628357 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9911002590603321 996 $aStrategic Responsiveness$94379986 997 $aUNINA