LEADER 03652nam 22005895 450 001 9910999666703321 005 20250426124704.0 010 $a3-031-82042-8 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-031-82042-7 035 $a(CKB)38641712500041 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-031-82042-7 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC32029724 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL32029724 035 $a(EXLCZ)9938641712500041 100 $a20250426d2025 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe Oversight of Outsourcing US Intelligence After 9/11 $ePrivate Intelligence Contractors /$fby Bülent Sungur 205 $a1st ed. 2025. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer Nature Switzerland :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2025. 215 $a1 online resource (XXVII, 318 p. 16 illus., 6 illus. in color.) 225 1 $aNew Security Challenges,$x2731-0337 311 08$a3-031-82041-X 327 $aChapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Evolution of Outsourcing US Intelligence and Intelligence Oversight Mechanisms from the Cold War to 9/11 -- Chapter 3: The Mismanagement of Contractors over the Iraqi WMD Issue Background: The Rise of PICs After 9/11 -- Chapter 4: PICs and Abu Ghraib -- Chapter 5: The Outsourcing of US Covert Drone Operations -- Chapter 6: Conclusion. 330 $aThis book is a story about Private Intelligence Contractors (PICs) and their relationship with the United States executive and legislative principals in the War on Terror when the line between the public and private sectors has been increasingly blurred. PICs have challenged the traditional approach which assumes that sensitive intelligence tasks should be performed by government officials because of their importance for national security. So this book examines the principal-agent relationship and the oversight problem between PICs, the US Intelligence Community (IC), the president and Congress after the 9/11 attacks. The book demonstrates that by exploiting information asymmetry, adversely selected PICs can violate legislative rules and goals such as by performing inherently governmental tasks, colluding with the IC, capturing the control of the task and contractual process, abuse, waste and fraud. In addition, to get around congressional oversight and achieve his or her hidden agenda, the executive principal can also mismanage contractors through the IC or delegate contractors to perform inherently governmental tasks. Bülent Sungur holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Aberdeen, UK. His research interests include oversight of intelligence organizations, outsourcing intelligence and law enforcement intelligence. 410 0$aNew Security Challenges,$x2731-0337 606 $aAmerica$xPolitics and government 606 $aDevelopmental psychology 606 $aIntellect 606 $aAdministrative law 606 $aAmerican Politics 606 $aIntelligence Development 606 $aAdministrative Law 615 0$aAmerica$xPolitics and government. 615 0$aDevelopmental psychology. 615 0$aIntellect. 615 0$aAdministrative law. 615 14$aAmerican Politics. 615 24$aIntelligence Development. 615 24$aAdministrative Law. 676 $a320.9 700 $aSungur$b Bu?lent$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01817177 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910999666703321 996 $aThe Oversight of Outsourcing US Intelligence After 9$94374647 997 $aUNINA