LEADER 03936nam 22004213 450 001 9910996569503321 005 20250425080301.0 010 $a1-77385-608-1 010 $a1-77385-609-X 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC32024031 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL32024031 035 $a(CKB)38541133100041 035 $a(EXLCZ)9938541133100041 100 $a20250425d2025 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe Material Mind $eReduction and Emergence 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aCalgary :$cUniversity of Calgary Press,$d2025. 210 4$dİ2025. 215 $a1 online resource (308 pages) 225 1 $aBSPS Open Series ;$vv.3 311 08$a1-77385-606-5 327 $aFront Cover -- Half Title Page -- Series Page -- Full Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Foreword and Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 | Unity of Science and Reduction -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Deductive and Ontological Unification -- 3. The Deductive-Nomological Model of Reduction -- 4. The Model of Reduction by Analogy -- 5. The Reduction of Thermodynamics to Classical Mechanics -- 6. The Synthetic Model of Reduction -- 7. The Reduction of Cognitive Phenomena by Neurophysiology: Elimination or Co-Evolution? -- 8. Conclusion -- 2 | Can Reductive Explanations Be Constructed A Priori? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Priori Reduction in the Framework of Two-Dimensional Semantics -- 3. Two Concepts of Reduction and Realization: Micro-Macro and Role-Occupant -- 4. Multi-Realizability -- 5. Conclusion -- 3 | Cognitive Abilities as Macroscopic Dispositional Properties -- 1. Introduction -- 2. General Arguments against the Efficacy of Dispositions -- 3. Dispositional and Theoretical Properties -- 4. The Epiphenomenal Trilemma of Macroscopic Dispositions -- 5. The Example of Colour Representation -- 6. Dispositional Properties with Multiple Manifestations -- 7. Conclusion -- 4 | Emergent Properties -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Minimal Conditions and Weak Emergence -- 3. Broad and the Epistemic Conception of Emergence -- 4. Strong Emergence in Terms of the Impossibility of Deduction -- 5. Emergence as Non-Aggregativity -- 6. Emergence in Terms of Non-Linear Interaction and Mill's Principle of the Composition of Causes -- 7. Qualitative and Quantitative Difference -- 8. The Limits of Explaining Emergent Properties -- 9. Avoiding Panpsychism -- 10. Response to a Version of Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory -- 11. Emergence, Reduction, and Supervenience -- 12. Conclusion -- 5 | The Causal Efficacy of High-Level Properties. 327 $a1. Introduction -- 2. Causality, Causal Responsibility, and Causal Explanation -- 3. Mental Causation and Downward Causation -- 4. Mental Properties or Physical Properties Conceived with Mental Concepts? -- 5. Conclusion -- Conclusion -- References -- Index -- Back Cover. 330 $aThe Material Mind develops a concept of reduction that is compatible both with scientific change and with the possibility of multiple reduction bases. It shows that cognitive and other higher-level properties can be construed as causal powers, develops a concept of emergence compatible with reduction, and shows that the integration of the mind into a scientific conception of the world does not deprive mental properties and events of causal efficiency. The book defends the possibility of downward causation of physiological effects by cognitive causes, by questioning the justification of both the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal-explanatory exclusion. 410 0$aBSPS Open Series 700 $aKistler$b Max$0732673 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910996569503321 996 $aThe Material Mind$94372183 997 $aUNINA