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181   $2rdacontent
182   $2rdamedia
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200 10$aPolitics, paradigms, and intelligence failures $ewhy so few predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union /$fOfira Seliktar
210  1$aLondon ;$aNew York :$cRoutledge,$d2015.
215   $a1 online resource (294 p.)
300   $aFirst published 2004 by M.E. Sharpe.
311 08$a0-7656-1464-2 
311 08$a1-317-46244-0 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $a""Cover ""; ""Half Title ""; ""Title Page ""; ""Copyright Page ""; ""Dedication ""; ""Table of Contents ""; ""List of Abbreviations ""; ""Preface ""; ""Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Predicting Political Change""; ""1. Theories of Political Change and Prediction of Change: Methodological Problems""; ""Methodological Problems of Tracking Changes in a Collective Belief System""; ""The Dimensions of a Collective Belief System: Existential Imperatives as Validity Claims""; ""Changing the Collective Belief System: The Process of Delegitimation""
327   $a""Activating the Process of Delegitimation: Trigger Conditions of Change""""The Durability of Legitimacy: Personal and Systemic Factors of Maintenance""; ""Legitimacy of the Soviet Union: The Theory and Politics of a Concept""; ""Rational Choice Theory and Soviet Legitimacy: Coercion and Preference Falsification""; ""2. Oligarchic Petrification or Pluralistic Transformation: Paradigmatic Views of the Soviet Union in the 1970s""; ""The Totalitarian Model: Oligarchic Petrification and Final Doom""; ""The Revisionist Model: Pluralistic Transformation and Final Convergence""
327   $a""The Chernenko-Gorbachev Transition: The View from Moscow """"The Chernenko-Gorbachev Transition: The View from Washington ""; ""5. Acceleration: Tinkering Around the Edges, 1985-1986""; ""Revisiting Communist Legitimacy: In Search of a New Formula""; ""Domestic Reforms and Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: Clouding the Vision for a Global Class Struggle""; ""Making Sense of Gorbachev: The Politics of the Predictive Process in Washington""; ""The Revisionist Paradigm Vindicated? Gorbachev and the Reformability of the Soviet System""; ""6. Perestroika: Systemic Change,1987-1989""
327   $a""Experimenting with a New Legitimacy Formula: From Gramsci to ""Socialist Democracy"" and ""Socialist Market""""
330   $aWashington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got what right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of ""who won"" the Cold War. Like the disputes over ""who lost"" China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlook
607   $aSoviet Union$xPolitics and government$y1953-1985
607   $aSoviet Union$xPolitics and government$y1985-1991
676   $a327.73047/09/048
676   $a327.7304709048
700   $aSeliktar$b Ofira.$0659156
801  0$bFlBoTFG
801  1$bFlBoTFG
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910975309003321
996   $aPolitics, paradigms, and intelligence failures$94495151
997   $aUNINA